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ABSTRACT:
Technology permeates and is an integral part of the whole social,
economic, cultural and political fabric of society.

The state of the tech-

nology which exists at a particular point in time is, amongst other things,
the product of many individual decisions and preferences by governments,
industry, individuals and the community.

Whilst some technology involves

substantially new developments, much of it is evolutionary and occurs
largely out of sight.

The same is true of the process of Technology Transfer which at its
most fundamental level involves the movement of knowledge across boundaries.

The processes and methods of technology transfer vary according to

the type and nature of the technology to be transferred.

During any trans-

fer process however a number of factors may be involved either dependently or independently, these include people, organisation structure and
culture, and the economic and political environments.

The Snowy Mountains Scheme, a dual purpose hydro-electric and
irrigation complex, widely regarded as being one of Australia's greatest
engineering achievements, provides an example of the transfer of technology
from one country to another.

The Scheme as it was finally constructed

was first suggested in 1926 though no firm action was taken until 19^8
when a joint committee comprising representatives of the Commonwealth,
New South Wales and Victorian Governments confirmed the viability of
a dual purpose scheme.

The Snowy Mountains Hydro-electric Authority

was created by an Act of Federal Parliament in 1949 and was charged
with the responsibility of constructing the Scheme.

It is argued that neither the technology nor the resources necessary
for the planning and construction of the Schenne were available in Australia
at that tinne, and that without the assistance of the United States Bureau of
Reclannation (U.S.B.R.) the commencennent of the Scheme and its subsequent
development would have been significantly delayed. It is further argued
that this assistance was a form of technology transfer with the U.S.B.R,
transferring to the Snowy Mountains Authority (SMA) and thus to Australia,
technology in the form of hydro-electric and irrigation concepts, designs
and work practices. An examination of how and why this transfer took
place provides insights into aspects of the technology transfer processes
particularly within Government and Statutory Bodies.

INTRODUCTION
Technology when described in its widest sense includes a tool, technique
or social organisation or process. It is also useful to think of technology in
the following ternns as argued by 3ones:
"Technology is a perishable resource comprising knowledge, skills and
the means of using and controlling factors of production for the purpose
of producing, delivering to users, and maintaining goods and services
for which there is an economic and/or social demand." (p.vi)[lj
Given these comments, technology permeates and is an integral part
of the whole social, economic, cultural and political fabric of society.

There is no optimal technology in an absolute sense [2j. The way to
organise some purposeful activity is best or better relative to a particular
complex of resources that are to be organised and to the particular circumstances
in which the activity will operate.

Indeed the state of technology existing at

any one point in time is a product of evolution over time within the economic,
social and political environment [3J. It is also the product of many individual
decisions and preferences by governments, industry, individuals and the community and the multiple interactions between these preferred choices.

In dealing with technology there is a tendency to consider it only in
terms of the visible and distinctive peaks, the wholly or substantially new
product and processes, and to ignore the mass of evolutionary technological
change which proceeds spontaneously and largely out of sight. [^J There
is a similar tendency to focus on a single element or factor such as foreign
ownership or capital inflow, and to be myopic about the myriad of other
issues that play a part in technological change and technology transfer. In
this regard it must be remembered that technological change is often a
C0902698A50

cumulative process [3j and each extension of knowledge and each new solution
to a technological problem creates the potential for further change.

The

development of this potential does not take place automatically however, and
requires considerable human effort and commitment of resources.

That is

to say that whilst the application of rational principles to the control and
re-ordering of space and matter is central to technology it should not be
forgotten that these processes are concerned with human ends.[6j

Not only does the development of new technologies require effort and
commitment but so too does the transfer of technologies from one area to
another.

3ust as there are a large number of definitions and models of tech-

nology, some of which stumble into the methodological pitfall of reification of
technology as an object[7j, whilst others suffer from a single deterministic
approach, so too there are a large number of models of technology transfer
which emphasise differing aspects of the writer's individual frames of reference.

Rather than become embroiled in argument over a precise definition of
technology transfer it should be recognised at the most fundamental level that
we are dealing with the movement of knowledge across interfaces while keeping in mind that there may be important distinctions between specific subelements within such a general framework.[8j

As there appears to be no

single best method to analyse the transfer process so too there appears to be
no best method for analysing the phenomena which comprise the transfer
process.

Transfer processes and methods in technological change involve a wide
range of factors including but not confined to people[9j, organisational, struc-

tural and political aspects.

Once it is recognised that there is no one best

method to achieve technology transfer it becomes necessary to ask how did
the process take place and why. Technology is moved by people:
move of its own accord.

it does not

It is not a black box which can be shifted at will

from one situation to another.[10j

To adopt the transfer process efficiently

to accommodate such changes calls for the removal of unnecessary constraints
on communication among participants, and therein lies the strength of Burns'
(1966) statement that "technology transfer is a process of agents not
agencies". [11J

Individuals can fulfil both formal and informal roles.

Formal agents

include liaison or transfer officers whose major function is to promote transfer and who operate at the interface between their own organisations and
potential receiver organisations.

This model is based on the use of agents

within the US Agricultural Extension Service of the late nineteenth century.
[12j

Whilst formal agents can be used as mechanisms to encourage and facili-

tate technology transfer processes, their success is dependent on their ability
to act as the interface between the source of technical assistance and the
potential customer.

Informal agents are any of the myriad of people involved

at different levels in the transfer process but who may not have been given
or assumed the formal role of transfer agents. In situations where the technology
to be transferred is so complex or novel that only the innovator fully understands it and its potential, agents who lack close knowledge of the technology
may not be aware of the difficulties in achieving an appropriate contextual
fit in a new environment and thus are not able to positively assist in the
transfer process.

The level and type of communication about the technology also affects

its successful transfer. Certain types of information can only be effectively
exchanged by face to face communication, for whilst the distribution of documentation may ensure a minimal level of awareness, it is the combination
of documentation and personal interaction which enables the level of communication necessary for effective transfer to be achieved.

As with communications, the motivation of both individuals and organisations can have significant e f f e c t s on transfer. Motivation is most often
thought of as operating at the level of the individual however there is a corresponding level of receptivity which operates at the organisational level and
which also a f f e c t s the mechanism and success of technology transfer.

Receptivity

in an intra organisational sense, is a function of the perceived appropriateness
of the particular technology.

It is also influenced by the long term objectives

and plans of the organisation.

Just as behavioural features influence the mechanisms and outcomes
of technology transfer programs, so too do various aspects of the relationship
between the technology producing, transferring and receiving organisations.
There are formal aspects of this relationship, such as the contractural arrangements under which the technology transfer is carried out, and also the contextual ones which have their origins in the nature and abilities of the parties.

Personal contacts established through programs, courses, meetings and
visitor services, all help to build up knowledge about and establish contacts
important for e f f e c t i v e technology transfer. Visits can ensure familiarity
with latest techniques and therefore can transfer these back for application
and modification of the technical or work practices.

Whilst strategic human resources are one of the prerequisites for successful transfer, others include the scientific and technical infrastructure, and
international co-operation [13j including the role of the state.

The technology infrastructure or delivery system is the key linking network between the producers and users of technology.

It functions amongst

other things to bring perceived or articulated user needs to the attention
of funders and research

technology producers, and in turn delivers research

results or technology to meet stated user requirements.

Technology delivery systems within industrialised nations have been
broadly defined by four categories of participants according to Anyos [ H j .
These include "Funders or Entrepreneurs" which include public or private
organisations that provide financial resources for the development or adaptation
of technologies.

In the USA this role is taken primarily by Federal Govern-

ment agencies such as NASA, and large private sector producers such as
IBM and General Motors.

"Research and Development Producers" are found

in both public and private sector organisations.

These include government

laboratories, universities, research institutes and private research and development activities.
processes.

These may be funded either internally or via government

"Linking Agents or Brokers" are those public or private organisations

or individuals that expedite the movement or diffusion of the technology
within or across national boundaries.

This category is said to comprise func-

tional interest groups, professional organisations, trade associations, consultants, and any others who work to utilise new technologies on existing problems.
In these cases it is the brokers role to identify applications within the public
and private sectors, recognising that utilisation will almost inevitably involve

modification and adaptation to meet the expressed needs of the user. The
final category of participants are the "Users".

This group is broadly charact-

erised by two generally different participants:

those who benefit directly

from the transfer of a given technology, usually the private sector, and those
who benefit indirectly from the transfer, the ultimate user or consumer of
the product of the technology.

In addition to the Anyos model of explaining infrastructure, it is argued
that management forms an important part of the infrastructure because at
the actual point of implementation of technology transfer, management which
in the organisational sense is the process of utilising material and human
resources to accomplish designated objectives, is essential.[15j Each individual
project presents special problems and the choice and application of mechanisms
such as human resources, organisation design and structure, use of contracts,
transfer of patent rights and licencing, and the identification of technology
brokers or "catalysts" can only be resolved and optimised at the working
level.

Support for and through the technology infrastructure is only one of
the ways

that the state influences the transfer of technology.

Young [16J

speaks of government involvement as being either regulatory or non-regulatory.
In the former, influence is through economic and legal frameworks including
traditional micro economic measures such as fiscal policy, bank rates, credit
policies, etc, taxation policies and Companies and Trade Practices Acts.
Non regulatory measures may range from exhortation and voluntary agreement through the provision of advice and services [17j including consultancies,
and government research establishments, to the development of a system

of financial inducements for particular types of developments such as regional policies, re-equipment schemes, and specific public support for certain
industries and developments.

Since at least t h e early 19^0's the governments

of all industrialised countries have been playing an increasingly direct role
in t h e promotion and direction of their national industries.

The role of pro-

moter of technology is o f t e n assumed by governments because of the high
risk and high costs involved in the development of new technologies.

It has also been argued t h a t Governments resort to intervention as a
means of prodding s t r a t e g i c parts of the economy [18J.

Dell [19J has argued

t h a t the four major influences of the growth of these interventionist policies
were t h e growth of international competition which eroded t h e basis of
laissez-faire f r e e t r a d e policies, a feeling of economic failure especially
following the depression of the 1930's, the increasing recognition of d i f f e r e n c e s
between private and social costs, and the emergence of specific social requirements t h a t could not be met without the intervention of the s t a t e .

This

last group comprises such diverse aspects as education, deployment of labour,
and provision of energy [20].

The role of government in promoting economic

growth and limiting the simultaneous social disbenefits has become a c e n t r a l
plank in modern industrial society.[21J

The role of governments in promoting technological innovation including t r a n s f e r is also a political one.

According to Wells [22j, t h e spectacular

achievements arising from the application of science and technology in the
1940s in t h e USA led to major innovations which in a very brief period of
t i m e resulted in the creation of new industries, t h e restructuring of some
and t h e demise of others.

In the American aerospace, electronics, nuclear and petrochemical
fields vast new complexes of industrial, government and university research
centres were established as the result of political decisions by Presidents
Roosevelt and Truman to extend the Government's responsibilities for science
beyond merely their establishment but rather to couple science and government
to serve the national interest.

This promotion of technology in particular

sectors in order to realise various national goals should not be seen in isolation however for not only is technology used to fill defined needs, but social
needs and values are themselves built and shaped by technology.

The success

of government collaboration with science during the 19^0s led to increased
government support of scientific enquiry which represented a major institutionalisation of science and technology as a formal tool for achieving government policy and corporate development [23J.

The transfer of technology cannot in most cases serve as a substitute
for industrial research and development [2^J. Certain of the most advanced
technologies cannot be learned in a formal way, and can only be absorbed
in laboratories, similar to research and development activity.

Bought tech-

nologies require adaptation to local conditions or products, and this adaptation generally though not always requires research and development.

Addi-

tionally the absorption of new technologies requires early preparation, and
the establishment of a capability able to develop its know-how towards the
new field.

Whilst the establishment of research and development laboratories
and facilities are generally associated with private industry, it is no less
true of technology transfer to government departments and agencies.

How-

ever, for transfer to be successful in the government sector an understanding

is required not only of the problems faced by the private sector but also
of the overall problems and issues with which the government is faced.

A basic requirement for successful technology transfer is that the source
possess technical knowledge and/or capability which could be useful to the
receiver [25j. Additionally the source must understand the needs and limitations
of the receiver.

The receiver on the other hand should have complementary

knowledge and capability, should understand the circumstances and potential
contributions of the source, should demonstrate interest and support this
with its own incentives.

If these conditions are met, and if there is mutual

confidence between the source and the receiver, then the way will be open
for successful technology transfer.

An example of the process of technology transfer is provided by the relationship between the United States Bureau of Reclamation and the Snowy
Mountains Hydro-electric Authority.

Whilst the role of the Commonwealth

Government is well known, little has been said of the role of the State Governments of Victoria and New South Wales, and even less about the role played
by the Bureau with respect to the Snowy Mountains Scheme through the provision of technical assistance, technical advice in both the USA and Australia,
and the training in America of Australian engineers by the Bureau. An examination of the roles of both sender and receiver of technology should therefore
provide insights into the involvement of people, the infrastructure and the
government in the process of technology transfer.

A GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE SNOWY MOUNTAINS SCHEME
The Snowy Mountains Scheme, a dual purpose hydro-electric and irrigation complex established by a Commonwealth Act, is located in south-eastern
Australia.

It impounds the south flowing waters of the Snowy River and its

tributary, the Eucumbene, at high elevations of the Great Dividing Range,
and diverts them inland to the Murray and Murrumbidgee Rivers through
two tunnel systems driven through the Snowy Mountains.

The Scheme also

involves the regulation and utilisation of the headwaters of the Murrumbidgee,
Tumut, Tooma and Geehi Rivers.

These diverted waters, in conjunction with the regulated flows in the
Geehi and Tumut River catchments, generate mainly peak load electricity
for the Australian Capital Territory and the States of New South Wales and
Victoria, as it passes through power stations to the irrigation areas inland
from the Snowy Mountains.

The Snowy Mountains Hydro-electric Scheme as finally constructed
involved the investigation, design and construction of 16 large dams and many
smaller diversion structures, some 80 kilometres of aqueducts, over 1^3 kilometres of tunnels, a pumping station and 7 surface and underground power
stations.

Its total generating capacity is 3 7^fO 000 kilowatts and, through

diversion, regulation and control of the rivers, an additional annual equivalent
of 2,360,000 megalitres of water is made available for irrigation purposes
in the Murray and Murrumbidgee Valleys.[26j

Broadly the Scheme falls into two sections: the southern Snowy-Murray
development, and the northern Snowy-Tumut Development.

Both developments

are connected by tunnels to the Schenne's main regulating storage, Lake
Eucumbene on the Eucumbene River.

SNOWY-TUMUT

DEVELOPMENT

Figure 1. Cross sectional view of the two developments of
the Scheme
The Snowy-Murray Development involves the diversion of the Snowy
River by a transmountain tunnel system to the Geehi River and thence to
the Swampy Plain River, a tributary of the Murray. In passing through the
tunnel system the diverted waters fall some 820 metres, generating
1 500 000 kilowatts in Murray 1 and Murray 2 Power Stations.

Additional power is generated in Guthega Power Station which utilises
the rapidly falling water of the Upper Snowy River on the east of the Divide
before it reaches the main tunnel system at Island Bend.

An essential part of this development is the two-way-flow EucumbeneSnowy Tunnel which connects the Snowy River with Lake Eucumbene.

When

the flows in the Snowy and Geehi Rivers exceed the needs of the Murray
power stations, water from the Snowy River at Island Bend is diverted through
this tunnel for storage in Lake Eucumbene. Low flows in the Snowy and
Geehi Rivers are supplemented by drawing the stored water from Lake
Eucumbene back through the same tunnel and delivering it to the transmountain tunnel system leading to the Murray power stations.
Additional water is supplied to the transmountain tunnel at Island Bend
by the Jindabyne Project which pumps from Lake 3indabyne the run off from
the Snowy catchment downstream of Island Bend.
The Snowy-Murray Development provides 980 000 megalitres of additional water annually through the enlarged Hume Reservoir to the Murray
River for irrigation in the Murray Valley. The total installed capacity of
the Guthega, Murray 1 and Murray 2 Power Stations is 1 360 000 kilowatts.
The Snowy-Tumut Development provides for the diversion of the Eucumbene, the Upper Murrumbidgee and the Tooma Rivers to the Tumut River,
and for the combined waters of these four rivers to generate electricity in
four projects: Tumut 1, Tumut 2, Tumut 3 and Blowering, in their fall of
800 metres before release to the Tumut and thence to the Murrumbidgee.
By agreement the Authority carried out the design and construction of Blowering Dam as an agent for the State of New South Wales, and the operation
of Blowering Reservoir is the responsibility of the NSW Government.
The transmountain tunnel system includes the Eucumbene-Tumut Tunnel
connecting Lake Eucumbene with Tumut Pond Reservoir. The normal function

of the tunnel is to divert water through the Great Dividing Range from Lake
Eucumbene to the Tumut River but, during periods of high flow in the Tumut
and Tooma Rivers, water in excess of that required for operating the power
stations in the Tumut Valley is diverted in a reverse direction through the
tunnel to Lake Eucumbene for storage. The total installed capacity in Tumut 1,
2 and 3 and Blowering Power Stations is 2 180 000 kilowatts, and this section
of the Scheme provides some 1 380 000 megalitres of additional water annually
to the Murrumbidgee River. [28j
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Sydney:

A HISTORY OF MOVEMENT TOWARDS A WATER-POWER SCHEME

Australia is a country of dramatic geographical changes ranging
from tropical rainforests and rugged mountain ranges, to treeless plains
and stony deserts. These varying conditions are accompanied and matched
by the variations in climatic conditions.

From the beginning of western

recorded history in Australia the country has been beset by the somewhat
cyclical fluctuations of drought and if not plenty, then at least sufficiency.
In addition to droughts, high annual and seasonal rainfall variability have
serious e f f e c t s on dry land agriculture and pastoral output and hence the
country's overall economy.

Australia is the world's driest continent, and

by world standards its water resources are relatively meagre.[lj

In the light of this it is not surprising that the Scheme was originally
conceived of solely in terms of irrigation and as a defence against drought.
This is particularly so when one considers that within two years of settlement of Sydney Cove the push outwards in search of suitable water supplies
had already begun.

Exploration continued rapidly during this early period with droughts
being the major motivator.

The boundaries in which settlers were allowed

to select land were redefined in 1829 bringing the sanctioned area to a
southern limit just south of Canberra and eastward to the sea, but as Governor
Gipps was to comment:
". . as well might it be attempted to confine the Arabs of the Desert
within a circle, traced upon their sands, as to confine the graziers or
woolgrowers of New South Wales within any bounds that can be properly

them: and as certainly as the Arabs would be starved, so also would
the flocks and herds of New South Wales, if they were so confined,
and the prosperity of the Country be at an end."(p.l27)[2j
By 18^5 it was estimated that there was a population of some 600
in the area between Cooma and the main Snowy range.
The relative frequency of droughts and their disastrous effects on
primary production, the worst in 1893-1903 reduced Australian sheep numbers
by more than 50%, cattle by 30% and average wheat yields to 2A bushels
per acre, the lowest ever recorded[3j, encouraged rural interests towards
the end of the nineteenth century to look to the irrigation potential of
the inland rivers.
Alfred Deakin, then a Minister of the Victorian Government, accompanied
by an engineer, journeyed to America, Egypt, India and Italy, to observe
irrigation practices and appraise their suitability for Victorian conditions.
While in the United States, Deakin met two Canadian brothers, the Chaffeys,
who had established successful irrigation developments in Canada and elsewhere,
and invited them to investigate the possibilities of similar enterprises in
Victoria. This invitation was accepted and the Chaffeys started work
in 1887 at Renmark and Mildura on the River Murray. Although at first
they met difficulties and misfortune the Chaffeys were able to prove beyond
doubt the feasibility of successful irrigation agriculture in Australia.
A further significant event occurred in 1886 when the Victorian Government passed "The Irrigation Act" which profoundly influenced the whole

future of water development in Australia, by the conferring of public
ownership on all water supplies, and by authorising the construction of
Government works for water conservation and irrigation.

Similar legisla-

tion followed subsequently in other States including New South Wales in
1896.

At about the same time the New South Wales Government set up
the Royal Commission on Water Conservation, under the Presidency of
W 3 Lyne MP (later Sir William Lyne). In 1884 P F Adams, Surveyor-General
of New South Wales, in evidence before the Royal Commission, suggested
that a diversion of the Snowy River to the Murrumbidgee for irrigation
purposes might be possible at a point about 8 kilometres above the Snowy's
junction with the Eucumbene.

It was proposed that Snowy water would

flow by means of a canal across the lowest gap on the watershed dividing the Snowy from the Murrumbidgee to Slack's Creek, a tributary of
the Murrumbidgee.

This proposal meant, in e f f e c t , that an open channel -

with no provision for a storage dam - would be excavated across the Great
Dividing Range at an elevation of about 914 metres.

As a result C Haylock, a New South Wales Government surveyor
in charge of parts of the Cooma District, was requested to review Adam's
proposal.

Accordingly, Haylock commenced a survey about 17 km from

Cooma on the road to Jindabyne, but was forced to abandon it a f t e r 50
km on account of severe drought conditions. As no future opportunity
presented itself for Haylock to continue, the Royal Commission in the
following year deputed one of its members, J B Donkin, to determine the
practicability of the proposed diversion.

The investigation subsequently

carried out by Donkin:
. . placed beyond the reason of doubt the question as to whether
the levels of the intervening country would permit of a diversion from
the Snowy into the Murrumbidgee, but there still remains the task
of demonstrating absolutely by a detailed survey and levelling whether,
in view of the physical difficulties to be overcome, the necessary works
can be constructed at a cost which would afford a reasonable presumption that they would be remunerative."(p. 725)[^J

Thus Donkin confirmed the physical practicability of Adams' earlier
proposal, but left the question of its economic practicability unanswered.
He foresaw however that:
". . great national necessities warrant correspondingly bold measures
of relief. The levels and general configuration of the country from
the Snowy River to Lake George demand instrumental examination,
as they apparently point to an endowment from Nature for the express
purpose of conducting water from an enormous snow-fed reservoir
to the rich plains of the Monaro, and thence, after being stored in
Lake George, to be distributed over thousands of square miles of
arable land lying in the doab of the Lachlan and Murrumbidgee Rivers,
now subject to long periods of disastrous droughts which render
futile the labour of husbandry, cripple all mining industry, and surround with dread uncertainty every form of pastoral enterprise."(p.996)
[3J

Although the Lyne Royal Commission on Water Conservation highlighted Adams' proposal to divert the Snowy River and confirmed the

viability of irrigation, no specific recommendations were made concerning
the diversion of the Snowy River. There is no doubt that at the time this
was a small issue compared with the paramount importance of the Murray
and Murrumbidgee Rivers for irrigation. The question of the use of Snowy
water for irrigation was however kept under review by the New South
Wales Government as part of the work program of the newly created Water
Conservation Service, a body established in terms of the New South Wales
Water Act of 1896, as a branch of the Department of Mines and Agriculture
(transferred later in the same year to the Department of Public Works).
McKinney who as Principal Assistant Engineer for Water Conservation
was responsible for the Service, also instituted a system of river gaugings
and other studies of the Murrumbidgee and Murray. It is probably not
too great a claim to say that the activities of the New South Wales Conservation Service helped to keep alive politically the question of the use
of the waters of the Snowy particularly when public interest in the matters
raised by the Lyne Royal Commission on Water Conservation was waning
as a result of good seasons in the late 1880s and early 1890s.[6j

Not all investigators were enthusiastic about the prospects of successfully
diverting the Snowy River for irrigation at an economical cost, and Adams'
original proposal for the diversion of the Snowy (as investigated by Haylock
and Donkin) was still a live issue with the New South Wales Government who
brought it to the notice of the 1902 Interstate Royal Commission on the
River Murray.

This Commission obviously thought the proposal practical

because it instructed its Secretary, R T McKay, who was then Assistant
Engineer, Water Supply Branch, NSW Department of Public Works, to
conduct a further investigation which was purported to have eventually

confirmed the view that Snowy water could be diverted across the Great
Divide.
Notwithstanding confirmation of the physical practicability of diverting Snowy water inland, no action was taken by the New South Wales Government to implement Adams' irrigation proposal.

As noted previously, interest

in the whole idea waned as good seasons followed the drought years of
the latter half of the century. The proposal did however highlight the need
for irrigation at that time in parts of southeastern Australia, especially as
a defence against drought, and identified the State of New South Wales
as the prime mover in the initial schemes for the use of Snowy waters. The
question of diversion for irrigation was not revived as a formal expression of
public policy until World War II, and then as part of a dual-purpose proposal
advanced by the New South Wales Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission.
The initial proposals for the use of Snowy waters for hydro-electric
power, a process which simply refers to the method of generating electricity
using pressurised water, were associated with the federation of the Australian
states.

The power potential of the Snowy River was first formally recog-

nised by T Pridham an Assistant Engineer attached to the Royal Commission
on Sites for the Seat of Government of the Commonwealth, who reported
favourably on the Snowy as a source of power for Dalgety which at that
stage was a preferred site.

In his report Pridham found that the best

site for a large hydro-electric installation was:
". . 22 miles from Dalgety, and suggested the construction of a tunnel
about 3i miles in length and a storage reservoir upstream.

It was

estimated that such a scheme would ensure a constant flow through

the tunnel of at least 1000 cubic feet per second which with a head
of 300 f e e t , would furnish 20 000 net horsepower continuously."
(p.^83)[7j

The power potential of the Snowy River was further confirmed by
another governnnent employee, the surveyor C R Scrivener, who was requested by the NSW Minister for Home Affairs, to obtain information on
suitable sites in the southern Monaro for the proposed Federal capital.
As a result of his investigation. Scrivener reported that:
". . with a suitable equalising weir the waters of the Snowy River
might be utilised for the generation of electrical power",
but:
". . it would be wise, in estimating the capacity of the river, to adopt
a minimum flow of 200 cubic feet per second, in order to meet a
year or a succession of years of abnormally low rainfall. Now a
flow of 200 cubic feet per second will give 17 horsepower for each
foot of fall on the basis of 75 per cent efficiency; therefore, with
a fall of 100 f e e t , 1 700 horsepower would be available.

This fall,

making due allowance for the necessity for placing the turbines
above flood level, may be obtained between points on the Snowy
River not more than one mile apart, in a direct line and within about
five miles of the city site.

With 1700 horsepower, water might be

pumped from the river to the Service Reservoir, and the Federal
City electrically lighted for many years."(p.50^f)[8j

Pridham and Scrivener's investigation established the feasibility
of the Snowy as the source of power for the proposed national capital

and, when the present Canberra was finally selected in 1908 as the site,
the limited availability of water power in the immediate locality was
identified as being insufficient for future needs. (It should be noted that
the capitals of Sydney and Melbourne were and are located within close
proximity to coalfields which supply the fuel for their thermal stations.)
Accordingly in 1909 the State of New South Wales agreed to allow the
Commonwealth Government to use Snowy waters, without payment, for
the provision of electric light and power for the then Federal Capital
Territory.[9j The Commonwealth did not, at the time, exercise its powers
in this regard, but the general principle of the use of Snowy waters for
power was revived during World War I, as the New South Wales Public
Works Department carried out surveys on the viability of using the waters
in question for the generation of electricity for Sydney and the south
eastern corner of the State.

The first firm proposals for the use of Snowy waters for power
generation were made in 1920. Following preliminary surveys by the New
South Wales Department of Public Works, W Corin, Chief Electrical Engineer,
recommended the:
". . construction of a dam in the neighbourhood of 3indabyne, or possibly
several dams on the contributing streams higher up. A race will lead
thence to a subsidiary reservoir at Beloka Creek, the water being conveyed from this reservoir by a tunnel through the mountain and again
by a short f a c e to a pipe-head reservoir above Popong Creek, a fall
of some 1 600 feet to the bed of the latter being obtained.

The con-

figuration of the country is such that to take full advantage of this
fall it will be necessary to divide it into two sections, placing one

power station some 300 f e e t below the first pipe-head reservoir, and
constructing a second power station when necessary to deal with the
remaining 1 000 feet fall or more. For the initial development no
dams are necessary, the unregulated flow of the river being sufficient
to develop approximately 2k 000 kW continuously."(p.613)[10j

The New South Wales Government took no action to implement this
"Corin" or "Big Bend" scheme as it was known at that time and in 1937 a
London firm of engineering consultants which had been commissioned by
the New South Wales Government to investigate future dealing with the
potential of the Snowy River for power generation recommended the construction of a dam at 3indabyne with a tunnel and pipeline to deliver
water to power stations on the Snowy River at Biddi Point, a distance
of 29 km, in order to generate 250 000 kilowatts.[lIj

This recommendation, essentially a power proposal with no provision
for irrigation, had a mixed reception.

In view of the limited advantages

which would accrue to Victorian farmers through the use of Snowy waters
for irrigation, Victoria was eager to see the development of the hydroelectric scheme as recommended by the consultants.

On the other hand,

New South Wales farmers in the southern part of the State regarded such
a purely power proposal as a waste of valuable irrigation water, and accordingly, in February 1939, a meeting of water users at Griffith protested
against the consultants' recommendation and formed the Murrumbidgee
Valley Water Users' Association.

Whilst New South Wales and Victoria were divided on the optimum

use of Snowy waters, the recommendations posed the possiblity of the
Snowy providing some of the electrical needs of growing urban populations and secondary industries.

In common with the earlier irrigation

investigations, however, the hydro-electric scheme advocated by the consultants was regional rather than national in its concept.

The first formal proposals for the use of the Snowy for water supply
purposes were associated with the projected needs of the Federal capital.
In addition to recognising the power potential of the Snowy, both Pridham
and Scrivener saw the possiblity of the river supplying the proposed Federal capital site at Dalgety with its water requirements.[12j

These early proposals were extended in the 1920s to include a water
supply for Sydney and intermediate country towns.

In 1926 T W Keele -

a member and former President of the Metropolitan Water Sewerage and
Drainage Board - investigated the possibility of bringing Snowy water to
Sydney from a storage dam at Jindabyne by tunnels and pipeline, following
generally the railway line between Cooma and Sydney, and providing, also,
for a water supply to Canberra and towns and settlements along the railway as far as Mittagong.

Bound up with this proposal was a high-level

scheme from Cataract Reservoir to deliver water on both sides of Sydney
Harbour at sufficient pressure to eliminate the pumping of water.

The above proposal was reviewed in 1927 by 3 G S Purvis - Chief
Engineer of the Metropolitan Water Sewerage and Drainage Board - but
remained substantially unaltered with the exception of cost estimates.
No action was taken by the Board to implement the Keele-Purvis proposals,

which were finally rejected in favour of the Warragamba schenne, primarily
on the grounds of comparative costs.

Interest in the use of the Snowy

River for metropolitan water supply was revived during World War II on
account of prolonged drought conditions in the Sydney water supply catchment
area and resultant water restrictions.

As before, the cost of diverting

Snowy waters to supply Sydney was generally considered to be the limiting
factor, and topical interest waned as conditions gradually improved.

The earliest recorded dual-purpose scheme was contained in Keele's
original water supply proposal, which included the installation of generators at the outlet from the planned pressure pipelines near Sydney.[13j

Although Keele's 1926 scheme was the first dual purpose proposal,
the idea of power generation and irrigation was not conceptually linked
until 1937 when R F and C J Harnett proposed a series of power stations
placed on the Murrumbidgee, into which the Snowy River had been diverted.

The general idea of the diversion of the Snowy River for more than
one purpose (i.e. irrigation or power generation or water supply) was
carried a stage further in 19^0 by R T McKay, for many years a

.

persistent advocate for utilising the waters of the Snowy River in a dual
capacity, viz., to supplement the flow of the Murrumbidgee River and
bring a supply to Sydney."(p.6)[l^J

McKay's agitation for the formulation of a specific public policy
for the development of the Snowy River was followed in 19^1 by formal
proposals from the New South Wales Water Conservation and Irrigation

Commission for the use of Snowy waters for both irrigation and hydroelectric power.

The Commission proposed [15j to divert the Snowy River

in order to augment the supply of water from Burrinjuck Reservoir for
the purposes of meeting the increased demand for irrigation water in the
Murrumbidgee Irrigation Area, and for further development of the area.
The irrigation aspects of this proposal involved the divertion of 1 200 cubic
f e e t per second from the Snowy to the Murrumbidgee by the construction
of a dam on the Snowy at Jindabyne, diversion works between 3indabyne
reservoir and the Murrumbidgee, and a dam on the Murrumbidgee at Billilingera.
It was also recommended by the Commission that the construction be
undertaken of auxiliary hydro-electric works with a total generating capacity of 50 000 kilowatts.

Interest in the development of an appropriate scheme, in whatever
form, did not suddenly cease at this time, however because of its overall
concern with the national economy the Commonwealth Government became
a major party to the considerations of a resource capable of irrigation
and power generation and which was likely to have impact beyond the
borders of any one state.

References
1

Hudson, W. The Development of Australia's Water Resources
with Particular Reference to Irrigation. Conference on Civil
Engineering Problems Overseas. London: Institution of Civil
Engineers. 196^.

2

E n d . in Gipps to Russel, 19 December 18^0. Historical Records
in Australia, Series 1, Vol XXI. In Wigmore, L. Struggle for
the Snowy. Sydney: O.U.P. 1968.

3

Foley, J C. Droughts in Australia: Review of Records from
Earliest Years of Settlement to 1955. Commonwealth Bureau
of Meteorology Bulletin ^3, 1957.

k

NSW Royal Commission - Conservation of Water - Final Report
of The Commissioners. In Notes and Proceedings of the Legislative
Assembly. VoL V, 1887.

5

Ibid.

6

Hardman, D.3. The Snowy Mountains Hydro-electric Authority:
Origins and Antecedents. Public Administration, Sydney, 27(3),
September 1968.

7

Pridham, T. Federal Capital: Proposed site at Dalgety - Report
on Available Water Supply and Water Power. Commonwealth
Parliamentary Papers. Vol. II, 190^.

8

Scrivener, C R. Federal Capital: Second Report on Proposed Sites
in the Southern Monaro District. Commonwealth Parliamentary
Papers. Vol. II, 190^.

9

See Commonwealth Seat of Government Acceptance Act 1909,
Sec.5; and New South Wales Seat of Government Surrender Act
1909, Sec. 6.

10

Report of the Department of Public Works - 1920, in Parliamentary
Papers, Vol. IV, 1920.

11

Report on Electrical Development in New South Wales.
Government Printer, 1937.

Sydney:

12

Hardman, D.J. op. cit.

13

Keele, T.W. Report to the Metropolitan Water Sewerage and
Drainage Board, recorded in Report of the Snowy River Investigation
Committee.
Report of the Snowy River Investigation Committee.

15

Ibid.

THE ROLES OF THE THREE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED

It was obvious that for various and often conflicting reasons and
priorities, the New South Wales, Victorian and Federal Governnnents all
professed keen interest in the waters of the Snowy River.[1J

When the Australian Constitution was formulated at the turn of the
century the problems of sufficient and regular water supply were obvious,
and the electricity industry was in its infancy. The first electricity supply
undertakings had been established during the late 1800s, primarily to supply
electric lighting, and by 1900 the use of electricity for industrial power was
still minimal.

In factories in New South Wales for example, the horse-

power of electric motors as a proportion of total horsepower of engines
and motors was less than one percent.[2j

It should not be surprising therefore that there is no specific reference
to electricity or water in the Australian constitution.

The control of water

rested with the States,[3j and the supply of electricity was in all probability seen as a public sector utility function which, in the Australian
Federation, rests with the States.

Whilst neither of these subjects appear in the Australian constitution,
it does not mean that there was no national interest in respect of them or
no role for the Commonwealth.

Any major industrial activity which demands

a major share of the country's capital and which, by way of reliability, or
unreliability, of supply a f f e c t s the standard of living of every Australian,
sooner or later, comes under scrutiny in terms of national interest and
development.

The role of the Commonwealth Government in the establishment of
the Snowy Mountains Authority and therefore of the Scheme can not be
stressed too highly. That it was in by far the best position to raise the
money for the construction of the Scheme can not be in doubt, but this
must be placed in the context of the Commonwealth's initial concerns
over the issues of post war reconstruction and development.

The issue of reconstruction went not just to the physical aspects of
the community but also included the whole complex of social, economic
and political arrangements. In short from a Government view it had to do
with the whole aspirations of the community for a better way of life.
The matters falling under that general heading however may have fallen
within the competence of the Federal, State or Local Governments or
semi Government bodies, and with that in mind a Federal Government
Cabinet sub committee was established to review the progress of reconstruction
planning and to co-ordinate and direct inter-departmental activities.[^J

This

sub committee comprised the Treasurer (Chifley), Attorney-General (Evatt),
Minister for Social Security (Holloway), and Minister for Labour (Ward),
and had the responsibility of examining schemes for reconstruction, planning, and correlation of all phases of reconstruction prior to making recommendations to Cabinet for the future conduct and direction of reconstruction.
The conservation and reticulation of water was specifically identified as
a most important feature of any reconstruction plan.[3j

Much debate followed the recommendation by the sub committee
that the Commonwealth be invested with sufficiently wide powers to save
the nation from the chaos likely to arise if it did not have such powers
over national reconstruction. This was due in no small part to Member

of Parliament Menzies' assertions that such proposals were nothing but an
excuse for a precipitate and premature election. Dr Evatt, the AttorneyGeneral, replied on behalf of the Government [6j that the assertions had
no foundation in fact and that the proposals were a genuine attempt to
guard against the anarchy and chaos that would threaten the country
unless reconstruction was dealt with on a national level. In the event,
the Constitution Alteration (War Aims and Reconstruction) Bill was introduced into Parliament by Dr Evatt on 1 October 19^2, with the comment
that the postwar problems of employment, housing, health, child welfare,
vocational training, markets and price stability would require statescraft
of a high order [7j which supposedly could only be provided at a Commonwealth level.
The debate did not go ahead on the Bill but was referred to a special
committee comprising eight members of the House of Representatives,
four from the Senate, (of which half were from the Opposition), plus the
Premier and Leader of the Opposition from each State Parliament, totalling twenty four. This committee reported to the only Constitutional Convention held since federation which unanimously decided that adequate
powers should be granted to the Commonwealth for the resettlement of
soldiers and advancement of their dependants and for the purposes of post
war reconstruction.[8j Bills were subsequently introduced into each State
Parliament sponsored by the Leaders of the Government, irrespective of
party, and were passed. On the 1 January 19^3 the Minister for Post War
Reconstruction (Chifley) announced the appointment of a Rural Reconstruction
Commission comprised of politicians and academics whose charter it was
to:

. . investigate problems associated with primary industry generally . . .
to submit specific plans for the rehabilitation of rural industries, for
such extension or rearrangement of primary industries as may be considered
necessary, having regard to the markets available or likely to be available externally and internally in the post war period, and for the
improvement of conditions of life in the rural areas."

(p.35)[9j

Dr H C Coombs was appointed Director-General of Postwar Reconstruction on 15 January 19^3.

Emphasis was placed on the planning for resettlement of servicemen
and women, and the rehabilitation of primary production, based on potential
markets available at home and abroad.

The aim was to give farmers greater

stability of income, and to improve efficiency in farming methods so that
primary industry would become less dependent on subsidies.

Secondary

production capacity which had been greatly extended both in size and technique because of the requirements of war also needed to be maintained.
An intensive national works program was seen to have been an important
part of the Government's plans to satisfy both the primary and secondary
sector needs.

The principal matters under this program were said to be

". . . water conservation and the extension of electrical facilities." (p.^7)
[lOj

The further development of the supply and distribution of electric

power in the post war years would greatly assist the range and possibilities
of regional planning.

Acknowledging the role that the States had to play in developing
and advising their more localised programs the Commonwealth established
the National Works Council at the Premiers' Conference in July 19if3.

This Council which consisted of representatives of the Commonwealth
and the States with the Prime Minister as ex officio Chairman had as
its aim the preparation of a national works program to provide for a smooth
transition from war to peace time employment and development.

The

first stage of the plan was to provide a reservoir of work to provide immediate
employment for service personnel returning to civilian life, thus inspiring
confidence in the commercial and industrial sectors and maintaining the
momentum of the nation's economy during the transitional period.

The

second and third stages of the plan involved the classification of works
into priorities, and the concentration on studies effecting proposals for
long range developmental plans.

Works projected for the first stage included the improvement of
country water conservation and irrigation projects to overhaul the drought
dangers and meet the demands of increased population, to improve the
sanitation systems, and to develop power and light output because of the
f a c t that many of the existing power supply systems had margins too small
[11J to meet the anticipated needs.

The Commonwealth Government, based on the requests reaching it
via the committee apparatus, and other information, decided that input
from regional advisory bodies would greatly assist their considerations
for regional development and industrial decentralisation.

The views of

these self interest groups would it was thought add another dimension
to the planning process.

It was through one of these groups, a deputation

representing a great part of the Murrumbidgee Area, that the proposal
for the diversion of the Snowy River waters for irrigation and generation
of electrical power, first formally came to the attention of senior members

of the Council and of Government in May 19^3. The deputation which
met Messrs Chifley and Dedman (then Minister for Postwar Reconstruction)
explained their proposal outlining that the cost would be in the order of
L13 million.

Neither Chifley nor Dedman appeared to place much merit

on the proposal, with Dedman pointing out the essential involvement of
the Victoria Government and the difficulty of formal agreements between
the States, and Chifley suggesting that there were a great many things
to do, with limited finance available.[12j In any event such a proposal
required consultation amongst the States and the determination of problems
and priorities.

Whilst the Commonwealth appeared to be paying little attention
to these proposals, the New South Wales Government by contrast had been
taking a most active interest with Victoria being interested but not as
active.

One of the many proposals which had been put forward for NSW

consideration was for the use of the Snowy River (and which has been
described in more detail in Chapter 2) was the dual-purpose power generation and irrigation proposal of R T McKay in 19^0.[13J

McKay's agitation

for the formulation of a specific public policy for the development of the
Snowy River was followed in 19^1 by formal proposals from the New South
Wales Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission for the use of Snowy
waters for both irrigation and hydro-electric power.

This continued interest

led to the establishment by the NSW Government in 19^2 of the Snowy
River Investigation Committee under the chairmanship of the State Director
of Public Works, 3 M Main, to investigate and report on proposals for the
utilisation of the waters of the Snowy River.

The result of this investigation and study of the engineering proposals
for the utilisation of the waters of the Snowy River produced a developmental report heavily biased [l^J on the side of New South Wales interests,
especially for irrigation, at the expense of the Victoria Government's
interests, especially in power generation.

These findings were vigorously

opposed by local interest groups in southeastern New South Wales and
in Victoria who had been agitating for a hydro-electric scheme to promote
the industrial development of the Monaro, Far South Coast and Gippsland.

The Victorian Government was not as protectionist in its consideration of the uses of the Snowy River though the State Electricity Commission
of Victoria had surveyed the river and selected several possible sites for
dams and power stations.

The Victorian Government's position could best

be summed up by the Chairman of the Victorian State Rivers and Water
Supply Commission who suggested in 19^1 that:
". . . . the development of the Snowy River Basin might be undertaken
by a separate Authority comprising representatives of the Commonwealth
and the two States concerned.

A precedent for such action already

exists in the River Murray Commission which has so satisfactorily
handled the problems of the development and utilisation of the River
Murray waters. . ." (p.98)[15j

It was about this time that the absence of appropriate multi-lateral
agreements between the three interested governments became obvious.[16j
The Commonwealth Government in addition to its general role as guardian
of the national interest (including defense), had the legal right to use Snowy
water for the provision of electric light and power for the Australian Capital

Territory.

The diversion of the Snowy River waters for use in New South

Wales, as recommended by the Snowy River Investigation Committee, would
deprive Victoria of those waters and could well raise complex legal problems
concerning state riperian rights.

Indeed the Victorian Government was

by no means an indifferent observer of New South Wales proposals, having
considered over the years various proposals for the development of the
Snowy in the interests of power generation, irrigation, flood control, and
water supply for its own State needs.

Following the

recommendations of the Snowy River Investigation

Committee[17j which implied that the large scale use of Snowy waters
was a national rather than Regional issue, the Premier of New South Wales
(the Hon. W 3 McKell) wrote to Prime Minister Chifley on 5 September
19^5 requesting the Commonwealth surrender its right to use Snowy River
waters on the basis that New South Wales wanted it for irrigation purposes.
At about the same time the Victorian Premier, Hon. 3 Cain, suggested
as an alternative proposal that the diversion should be used to provide a
considerable amount of electric power, whilst allowing the waters to still
be available for irrigation purposes.

In the light of these conflicting views the Minister for Postwar
Reconstruction, Mr Dedman, announced that a conference of Ministers
representing the Commonwealth, New South Wales, and Victorian Governments was being planned to consider utilisation of the Snowy river waters.
The Commonwealth's main concern was that:
". . . in view of Australia's limited water resources the final decision
the use of the River would ensure the maximum benefit for Australia

generally ."(pp.21 -22)[ 18J

The f i r s t c o n f e r e n c e took place on 25 and 26 June 19^6 a f t e r a
meeting of t h e Loan Council.

As expected the New South Wales and

Victorian Governments maintained their respective positions with regard
to water utilisation and in the case of Victoria, power generation as well.
The Commonwealth Government's position was t h a t it had a moral obligation
t o ensure t h a t legal (riperian) rights were maintained and t h a t because
t h e Commonwealth Department of Postwar Reconstruction had commenced
a review of the potentialities of the various proposals for diversion of
t h e Snowy, t h e States should take no f u r t h e r action at t h a t t i m e . As a
result of this meeting it was agreed t h a t the Commonwealth carry out
a preliminary investigation over the ensuing six months in relation to t h e
proposals of the two States,[19j irrigation in the Murrumbidgee as opposed
to power generation and irrigation in the Murray.

The subsequent investigation was conducted along two s e p a r a t e but
related lines of enquiry.

One was directed to ascertain the practicability

of building the requisite tunnels and storages and t h e costs involved, whilst
t h e other was to assess the agricultural advantages inherent in the two
schemes.

In view of the f a c t t h a t the h ydro-electric power which would

be available from either diversion was directly related to the type and
design of t h e diversion works, issues relating to the quantity of power
and its value were r e f e r r e d to a special engineering section of the inquiry
which was led by t h e Director-General of t h e then Commonwealth Department of Works and Housing, Dr L F Loder, with the assistance of t h e water
conservation, electricity and public works authorities of both New South

Wales and Victoria and t h e Com nn on wealth Army Survey Corps.

This

investigation concluded [20] t h a t the proposal to divert t h e Snowy into
t h e Murray was both practical and economical and t h a t in view of the
power potential of t h e Snowy and the urgent need for New South Wales
and Victoria to plan for f u t u r e power at an early date, t h a t t h e m a t t e r
be f u r t h e r investigated as soon as possible.

The agricultural and pastoral aspects were examined by an Economic
Investigating C o m m i t t e e of six Commonwealth o f f i c e r s directed by the
then Director-General of the Commonwealth Department of Post-War
Reconstruction, Dr H C Coombs. This C o m m i t t e e with the assistance of
t h e CSIRO's Division of Soils, sought information, advice and representations from all levels of State and Local Government and from individuals
likely to be a f f e c t e d by either proposal.

In trying to determine t h e relative

merits of the two schemes, t h e sometimes conflicting criteria [21j examined
included physical practicability, economy in the distribution of water, costs
and returns, developments in production, and stabilisation of rural industry.
The C o m m i t t e e finally concluded t h a t from an agricultural point of view,
diversion to t h e Murrumbidgee provided a b e t t e r agricultural solution than
did diversion t o the Murray.

An important qualification to this s t a t e m e n t

however was t h a t whether greater benefits actually accrued depended
on t h e policy on subsequent use as determined by the New South Wales
Government.

It was also pointed out by the C o m m i t t e e t h a t should a

decision be made in favour of the diversion to the Murray, e f f e c t i v e use
could still be made of these waters for irrigation purposes, though with
less national advantage agriculturally.[22j

¿fO
A joint report [23j based on these two investigations was subsequently
prepared and established a prima f a c i e case for the complete investigation
of t h e proposal to divert t h e Snowy into t h e Murray, including the proposal
t o divert some or all of the water back from the Murray to the Murrumbidgee
valley.

On 15 August 19^7 t h e Federal Minister for Works (Lemmon) released
t h e report \2k] on the diversion of the Snowy River which commented
t h a t t h e exploitation of the full potentialities of Snowy River would not
only overcome t h e shortages of power existing in New South Wales and
Victoria but would ensure adequate supply for f u t u r e industrial development,
as well as extending the existing irrigation systems.

This unique national

asset \25] when developed to its full potential would provide irrigation for
300 000 acres with a gross annual return in the value of foodstuffs of at
least LIO 000 000 p.a., as well as some 750 000 horsepower. If t h e diversion
went direct to t h e Murrumbidgee it would provide the same irrigation
c a p a c i t y but 300 000 horsepower less, which equated to 1,300,000 additional
tons of coal to be used annually.

Profit was expected to run at 8%, providing

a higher yield than t h a t shown by similar schemes run by utility companies
overseas.[26j

As a result of these reports the second conference of Commonwealth
and S t a t e Ministers decided to establish a c o m m i t t e e under t h e Chairmanship
of Dr L F Loder and consisting of two representatives from the Commonwealth
and two each from New South Wales and Victoria with power to co-opt
f r o m the relevant Authorities, to make a complete detailed investigation,
and to report to t h e

Premiers' Conference by August 19^8.

This c o m m i t t e e

(the Snowy River C o m m i t t e e ) did report back [27] following a comprehensive
survey of the resources of the Snowy River mountains area which included
aerial and field surveys, t e s t bores and f u r t h e r stream gaugings, and concluded
t h a t neither of t h e original proposals provided a satisfactory solution to
t h e use of t h e waters from the whole a r e a . Instead the C o m m i t t e e proposed t h a t in addition to the Snowy River, the Upper Murrumbidgee, Tumut
and Tooma Rivers be utilised to produce some 1 750 000 kilowatts.

This

was 60 000 kilowatts more than the consumption of Sydney and Melbourne
combined at t h e time, and would save an estimated ^ 600 000 tons of
coal a year whilst still providing water for irrigation.[28j

The report was sent to t h e relevant States Premiers and Ministers
in November 19^8 and on 9 January 19^9 Prime Minister Chifley announced
[29J t h a t even though the Report's recommendations were still being considered
by t h e Governments, the proposals were of such magnitude and national
i n t e r e s t t h a t they should be made public.

The speech, designed to f i r e

t h e imagination of the population and inspire confidence in the post war
economy emphasised the magnitude in increase in both power generation
and water for irrigation, the saving of limited coal resources, decentralisation of industry away from the major population centres, and the s a f e t y
of such a scheme from enemy a t t a c k .

He described a scheme:

. . so vast and so beneficial is a national scheme in the fullest sense
of the word.

It would be one of the g r e a t e s t projects in the history

of Australia's development and I hope the Governments concerned
will soon give consideration to it." (pp. 31-32) [30j

It should be remembered that during this time the Commonwealth
Government was also assessing the viability of establishing other industries
in country and remote areas.

The Northern Australian Development Committee

involved Commonwealth resources in the investigation of soils, pastures, and
the geology of the northern regions of Australia.

Other investigations

included the Ord River Scheme, the Katherine Research Station and the
pearling industry.

The Report of the Snowy River Committee was considered at the
third conference of Ministers representing the Commonwealth, New South
Wales and Victoria, held in Canberra on

February 19^9.

This conference

approved the recommendations of the committee regarding the diversion
of the flows of the Eucumbene and Tooma Rivers to the Tumut River
with compensatory flow from the Snowy to the Murray River.

In addition

to this it directed the committee to further consider the utilisation of
the balance of Snowy River waters and distribution of electric power between
the States (once the requirements of the Commonwealth for defense and
the ACT were met), and report back to the next Ministers' Conference
on 30 3une 19^9.

It is interesting to note that the Commonwealth's intentions with
regard to the development of the Scheme became clear when it was announced
[31J on 12 May 19^9 that Federal Cabinet had approved matters affecting
the drafting of the Snowy Mountains Hydro-electric Power Bill, and further
that the Bill was to be introduced during those sittings of the Parliament.
The Scheme was again described as:
" . . the greatest single project in our history.

It is a plan for the whole

nation, belonging to no one State nor to any group or section.

It is a

two-sided plan, because it provides not only for the provision of vast
supplies of new power but also for an innnnense decentralisation of
industry and population. This is a plan for the nation, and it needs
the nation to back it." (pp. 13-l^)[32j

The Bill was introduced to the Commonwealth Parliament on 26 May
19^f9 by Minister for Works Lemmon, who said:
"The purpose of this bill is to set up the Snowy Mountains Hydro-electric
Authority under the defense powers of the Commonwealth.

Defense

plans are divided into four categories - regional security, the defence
forces, defence research, and finally the industrial capacity of the
nation to support a defence machine. It is to the latter two aspects
that this bill has its greatest application, for it proposes to harness a
potential power of 1,720,000 kilowatts of hydro-electric power."(p.35)[33j

It was acknowledged in the speech to the Bill that final plans had not
been decided on for the final third of the project but that the net result of
the proposals would result in a power output roughly equivalent to the total
production of all power stations operating in Australia at that time.

More-

over the cost of power was about half that of conventionally produced
power and given this and the supply of water it was not unrealistic to
expect large inland cities to develop.

Also contained in the speech was

a reference [3^J to the Authority giving consideration to the engagement
of contractors from other parts of the world who had skilled teams capable
of carrying out some of the construction work as well as its own day labour
forces. The Bill was passed on 26 May 19^9.

The second investigation [35] by the Snowy River Comnnittee recommended that the balance of the Snowy River flow at Jindabyne be
diverted to the Murray, that irrigation interests be safeguarded, that an
agreement be reached between the three Governments regarding the
apportionment of water, and that after deduction of the Commonwealth's
requirements power be shared between New South Wales and Victoria on
the ratio of two thirds to one third. These recommendations were adopted
at the fourth conference of Commonwealth and State Ministers in July
19^9 where it was also agreed that the costs involved be met initially
by Commonwealth funds, since it was the only body capable of financing
such a scheme with repayment over a period of seventy years through
the sale of electric power to the State Electricity Commissions. In essence
the cost of irrigation was nil, as the cost of supplying irrigation water
was to be met by increased tariffs for the supply of power.
As a result of the adoption of the recommendations an advisory
committee was established to advise on the co-ordination of the Scheme
with developments by the States for the use of the waters diverted and
for the transmission, distribution, and use of the share of electric power
made available to the States. This Committee did not actually operate
until some years later (1953), and then only on an interim basis until the
agreements were finalised and the Snowy Mountains Council came into
being in 1959.
The path to resolution of the issues and agreement to construct
the Scheme was not a smooth one. It was obvious that blocks of interest
existed at all levels within the various Governments and in the particular
regions. It was only through the mechanisms of the State that the momentum

and forces were channelled into a fornn which was capable of success on
a national level.
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THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

As previously mentioned the various governments closely associated
with the Snowy Scheme had taken advantage of specialist advice gained
from both overseas investigations and consultants coming to Australia.
Young nations traditionally rely to an extent on their more technically
and economically developed allies to assist in the provision of solutions
to development problems.

In addition to existing techniques and experience,

cultural and political factors, geographical similarity which often gives
rise to common economic problems and solutions, was a major factor in
determining where Australia sought overseas assistance. This is exemplified by Deakin's 188^f investigations, when as Chairman of a Victorian
Royal Commission, he investigated irrigation schemes and practices in
India, Egypt, Italy and America.

He was glowing in his reports about what

he saw in America but far from enthusiastic about what he saw and learned
in Europe.[lJ

The principal result of Deakin's visits were the Irrigation Act

of 1886 which subsequently formed the basis of much of Australia's irrigation development, and the agreement between the Victorian Government
and the Chaffey brothers for the establishment of an irrigation settlement
at Mildura which proved beyond doubt the feasibility of successful irrigation
agriculture in Australia. [2j

Others too were impressed with developments

in the United States. [3J

The history of water development in the U.S.A., particularly in the
17 Irrigation States, showed utilisation of the nation's water resources
on behalf of its rapidly increasing population, with particular emphasis on
power and irrigation benefits, integrated to give optimum national gain.
The first Reclamation Act, passed by Congress in 1902, authorised

¿f9

the use of Federal funds received from the sale of public lands for the
survey, construction and maintenance of irrigation works, and provided
for payment of construction charges, without interest, by the beneficiaries
of a project. This Act also authorised the establishment of the Bureau of
Reclamation.

During the initial stages of reclamation the purpose was to provide
water for irrigation, little or no regard being paid to other benefits.

However,

recognition of reclamation as a multi-purpose operation with hydro-electric
as well as irrigation benefits was marked by the construction of Roosevelt
Dam on the Salt River in Arizona, completed in 1911. Revenues from
the lease of power privileges for the sale of energy were directed to be
credited to the cost of the power plant and to other aspects of the project,
thus establishing a basic concept - the use of power revenues to pay the
overall project costs, [^j

Prior to the construction of Roosevelt Dam the Salt River Valley
was an arid wasteland, suitable at best and only in small parts for grazing.
Between 1910 and 1950 irrigation acreage increased from 15,000 to 300,000;
population from 2^,000 to 330,000; farm revenues from $6 m. to $81 m;
and power revenue from $^f6,000 to over $8 m. Bank deposits increased
during the same period from $5 m. to $2^5 m.[5j

The Salt River Project was built by the Bureau of Reclamation on
behalf of the Salt River Valley Water Users Association.

It should be

noted however that the operation of the project remained in the hands
of the Water Users' Association and not the Bureau of Reclamation as
an agency of the Federal Government.

The first truly multi-purpose

development which was authorised by Congress to be built and operated
by the Bureau of Reclamation was the Boulder Canyon Project.

This work

was constructed under the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, and provided
for the disposal of project produced hydro-electric power to repay the
cost of project facilities allotted to the power purposes, and thereafter
to repay the cost of irrigation, water storeage and flood control.
In 1939 Reclamation Law was further adjusted to emphasise the
importance of power and of municipal water supplies in determining project
feasibility. A provision was included to the e f f e c t that those portions
of the project cost allocated to the purposes of navigation and flood control
were in the national interest and need not be repaid. Later legislation
provided for the conservation of fish and wild-life resources on Reclamation
projects and recognised such costs as non reimbursible. [6j
In 19^^ Congress authorised the development of the Missouri River
Basin in the States of Kansas, Nebraska, North and South Dakota, Montana
and Wyoming (known in the 1930's as America's dust bowl), with the following
priorities attaching to its water resources:
1

that flood control dams be built on the main stream, and tributaries
and soil conservation measures be applied throughout the catchment
area.

2

that hydro-electric plants be installed where feasible and practical
to provide power for industries, municipalities and farm houses
in the immediate areas;

to intertie with transmission systems

to the east and west; and thus provide revenue for repayment,
with interest,

of the hydro-electric facilities, and to assist in

repayment of associated irrigation projects.

3

that irrigation projects be constructed, where water supply and
storeage facilities are adequate, for long-range agricultural stability.[7j

Whilst not without its early failures, U.S. achievements demonstrated
according to Hudson [8J that well-planned multi purpose water resource
development was, as a rule, sound financial policy, even though on the
basis of the direct revenue, other than from the sale of power, such projects
might appear totally uneconomic. An example of 15 reclamation projects
constructed in the U.S.A. between 1916 and 1953, and collectively costing
$269 m, showed that for the year 1953 individual income taxes paid by
irrigation farmers and others whose employment directly stemmed from
the developments amounted to $106 m.

The estimated cumulative income

tax revenues from the project areas since 1916 amounted to $800 m. [9j
In addition, an estimate of the appropriate share of corporate and excise
tax revenues collected in and directly attributable to the developments
was $500 m. Thus, between 1916 and 1953, by making an investment of
$269 m, the Federal Government collected, mainly from immediate beneficiaries, $1300 m, not counting direct payment of project costs by water
and power users, i.e. taxes collected amounted to about five times the
investment.

These developments and practices from America were closely monitored
by a number of countries including Australia as a result of their engineering
and subsequent related economic achievements.

As far as the Snowy Mountains Scheme was concerned, the first
formal contact between the two countries came from a meeting between
officers of the Department of External Affairs at the Australian Embassy

in Washington and officials of US State and Interior Departnnents on 29
March 19^9. [lOj

At that meeting the 'Snowy River Diversion' project

and benefits accruing from the expansion of irrigation systems and power
development especially economic and defence aspects were outlined.
approach was ". . . accorded a most cordial welcome." [11J

The

and the Australian

representatives were confident that the U.S. administration would be able
to assist with furnishing technical advice and services of Government experts
under Public Law ^02 (Smith - Mündt Act)[12j, though this was by no means
certain at that time.

The United States Information and Educational Exchange Act 19^8
(or the Smith-Mundt Act - Public Law 402) had as its objectives:

to enable

the Government of the United States to promote a better understanding
of the U.S. in other countries, and to increase mutual understanding between
people of the U.S.A. and . . . other countries.

Among the means to be

used in achieving these objectives were:
(i)

An information service to disseminate abroad information about
the United States of America.

(ii)

An education exchange service to co-operate with other nations in:
(a)

interchange of persons, knowledge and skills

(b)

the rendering of technical and other services

(c)

the interchange of developments in the field
of education, the arts, the sciences.[13j

A note of caution was injected at that time when the Department
of External Affairs advised the Australian Embassy that Australia would

not require U.S.A. to provide an overall service nor a comprehensive check
on plans but rather it would appreciate advice on particular technical problems
especially in connection with long tunnels of major dimensions through
rock.

The principal type of expert assistance required was said to be from

construction engineers with experience in the use of modern plant for
the construction of dams and tunnels and in the installation of machinery
required for the development of hydro-electric power. [l^J At the same
time it was foreshadowed that a f t e r the legislation was passed in May,
the head of the Authority would visit the U.S.A. and relevant U.S.B.R.
experts would be invited to come to Australia for viewing the Scheme
and to tender advice.

Contact was maintained with the U.S.A. Government and Department
of Interior which included "a loan" [15j of Mr Dexheimer, Assistant Chief
Construction Engineer of the U.S.B.R. for three months from November
1950 to look at tunnelling problems on site.

This visit was arranged between

Commissioner Hudson of the SMA and Dr S L Savage, a Consulting Engineer
in Denver, and a past officer of the U.S.B.R. who acted on behalf of the
Authority with the Bureau of Reclamation. [16J At the same time it was
foreshadowed that SMA may require 2 or 3 specialist engineers on a loan
basis to help the Chief Investigation Engineer on "intricate problems".[17j
Dr Savage suggested that the Australian Foreign Office should make
a request to the U.S. State Department to obtain the services of Engineers
[18J, and whilst on a trip to Australia in October 1950 suggested that the
Bureau of Reclamation would probably be prepared to employ approximately
3 "bright young engineers" [19j in their Denver office to gain experience
in the Bureau of Reclamation's methods, a suggestion which was

enthusiastically received by Hudson.[20j
On 20 March 1951 Hudson wrote to Minister for National Developnnent Casey, suggesting that the Bureau of Reclamation could undertake
certain design work for the Authority under the provisions of US Public
Law ^02.

In the sanne letter Hudson stated that the best way the Bureau

of Reclannation could assist would be to undertake the design of the Upper
Tumut group of works from the upstream portal of the Adaminaby-Tumut
tunnel to the tailrace of the second power station on the Upper Tumut
River, including the Tooma-Tumut tunnel.

The designs would be based

on technical data furnished by the Authority and would be taken to the
stage of compilation of specifications and contract drawings for letting
the work by contract.

He estimated, in a very approximate way, that

the amount required for these services would be possibly $230 000. [21J
This suggestion was further reinforced by reliance on the argument
of national defence [22J, the premier reason used in the Government arguments
supporting construction of the Scheme. [23J

Hudson outlined that the

construction program provided for completion of the Upper Tumut works
excluding Tumut 2 within 8-9 years, thus providing an additional 250,000kW
with T2 two years later adding another 230,000 kW.

He argued that as

an urgent defence measure the adoption of unorthodox methods including
placing overseas contracts could mean the completion of all Upper Tumut
works within 6 years.

He further pointed out that power demand in combatant

countries increased by approximately 30% during the early stages of world
war 2 and that if war occurred within a few years, Australia could not
meet demands for increased power unless steps were taken immediately
to augment generating capacity over and above that planned by States.[2^J

Minister Casey accepted the argument and agreed that the use of
the U . S . B . R . would enable the Snowy to go ahead much faster on the design
side and make it unnecessary to employ high level design staff in high
numbers. [25]
At a meeting of Cabinet sub-committee empowered to commit the
Cabinet, comprising Messrs Fadden (Treasurer), Spender (External Affairs)
and Casey (National Development) and Senator O'Sullivan (Trade <5c Customs),
it was agreed to accept the opportunity to use U.S.B.R. s t a f f , that arrangements would be made by Minister Casey through the appropriate diplomatic
channels, and that the decision involved no prejudgement of the extent to
which any of the Snowy works were to be proceeded. [26j

(Such work

was estimated to not exceed $250 000 or 1112.000).
Discussions continued with the US Department of S t a t e and U.S.B.R,
where it was finally agreed that Section ^02 of Public Law ^02 (Smith-Mundt
Act) gave authority but that to get around Section ^03 which held that the
S t a t e could not enter into performance of services to a foreign government where such services may be performed adequately by qualified private
American individuals and agencies, the project should be given a training
slant in accordance with the basic objectives of Public Law ^02, viz.
information and educational exchange. [27]
The Australian reply [28J that the SMA would send up to 12 engineers
for training and Commissioner or Associate Commissioner with full authority
to enter into commitments were to travel to Denver, and that a senior
Authority engineer would also go to the United States to a c t as Liaison
Engineer, was unnecessary, however, as further discussions confirmed that

a d e q u a t e s t a t u t o r y authority existed to enable the U.S.A. to undertake
t h e service to t h e Scheme without t h e necessity to emphasise training.[29j

Following this, Associate Commissioner Lang proceeded to t h e U.S.A.
on 27 May 1931.

In the course of his negotiations with USBR he found

t h a t t h e d e f e n c e significance of the Snowy Mountains development as a
source of power for industry and irrigation water for food production was
of considerable interest to t h e U.S. authorities.[19J

It is not surprising

t h e r e f o r e t h a t the d e f e n c e aspect was mentioned in t h e preamble to the
Agreement (with t h e U.S.B.R.) in the same t e r m s as used in the SMHE
Power Act 19^9.

It is important to note t h a t Lang also recognised and

claimed t h a t t h e services of t h e U.S.B.R. could be a decisive f a c t o r not
only in expediting the early works for production of hydro-electric power
and water for irrigation but also in developing an e f f i c i e n t organisation
t o carry out t h e balance of the works. [30]

In collaboration with t h e Australian Embassy, Lang conducted t h e
negotiations and submitted a D r a f t Agreement and Report on the Agreement
to t h e Australian Ambassador who subsequently wrote to the Prime Minister
on 22 August expressing satisfaction with the Report and with the conclusions
reached.[31J
Whilst the D r a f t Agreement was expressed in fairly general t e r m s
it was obvious t h a t the final stages of the negotiations between t h e US
Authorities and Mr Lang envisaged the adoption of a much more extensive
and costly program than had been contemplated.

Both the Agreement

and t h e Report covered technical training and technical assistance and
whilst t h e Technical Training section presented no real concerns to the
Authority, the Technical Assistance section was not as clear cut.

The

Report in dealing with technical assistance submitted t h r e e a l t e r n a t i v e
schemes [32J:

Scheme A, in which t h e Bureau was to carry out all design and specification work which it can undertake including designs and specifications
for power station equipment such as turbines, generators and t r a n s f o r m e r s
and appurtenant plant and equipment (estimated cost $3,886,000
or LI,750,000)

Scheme B, in which the Bureau was to carry out all design and specification work which it can undertake for civil engineering works
leaving the Authority to carry out the design and specification work
for power station equipment (estimated cost $2,086,000 or L939,000),
and
Scheme C, the same as Scheme B except t h a t the Bureau would
proceed only t o the stage where construction tenders are called
(estimated cost $1,^00,000 or t630,000)

The e s t i m a t e d costs, it should be remembered, were based on t h e
f a c t t h a t a unit of work in Australia costing LI would cost $5 in America.
This cost disparity, coupled with the f a c t that the Authority has been
successful in recruiting some Norwegian Engineers who were experienced
in the design and execution of deep pressure shafts, was sufficient for
Hudson to recommend t h a t a modified Scheme C be adopted as the Authority's
p r e f e r r e d position. [34j The t o t a l e s t i m a t e d cost for both Technical Training
and Assistance totalled $880 000.

This recommendation was subsequently contained and supported in
Minister Spooner's l e t t e r to the Prime Minister Menzies. [35j

The Agreement was concluded by an exchange of notes between
Ambassador Spender and Mr James E Webb, Acting Secretary of State
and by the signature of an agreement concerning policies and procedures
for the contemplated program by Mr T A Lang, Associate Commissioner,
SMA, and Mr Goodrich W Lineweaver, Acting Commissioner of the Bureau
of Reclamation.

The Agreement provided that the Bureau of Reclamation

would make available expert advice, services and training for Australian
engineers who would not only study American projects and engineering
practice but also co-operate with the Bureau in the production of designs
and specifications for portion of the Snowy Mountains works. [36j
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File G271(l) - SMA file - Agreement Between the Commonwealth of
Australia and the United States of America for Technical
Training and Technical Assistance - Policy. (Part 1).

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY THE UNITED STATES
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION IN AMERICA
The agreement that the USBR would make available expert assistance
primarily took the form of design and specification assistance for that
portion of the Scheme known as the Upper Tumut works, the completion
of which was as important for the yielding of early results as it was for
the laying of foundations for water control to allow the Lower Tumut
sections of the Scheme to be built later.

The f a c t that the USBR was requested to undertake a modified
"Scheme C", all civil engineering design and specification work to the
stage where construction tenders were called, recognised that, notwithstanding
the nationalistic arguments of Wootten[lJ that there were sufficient qualified
engineers in Australia and to not use them was to demonstrate a sense
of inferiority, there simply were insufficient numbers of trained and skilled
personnel available to the Authority at that time.

This lack of resources

was not capable of being redressed within the timeframes set for the project's
completion by the Government, either by the importation of suitably skilled
people or the training of existing s t a f f . Each of these issues, use of Australian
engineers, immigration and training were addressed within the life of the
project and each contributed significantly to the successful completion
of the total Scheme. The limiting of the USBR to this role also meant
that as more Authority engineers reached the standard of efficiency required
and experience gained, they could progressively take over the work for
other Scheme projects, building on the foundations laid by virtue of the
technical assistance provided by the USBR.

In addition to the resources question it was clear that the USBR
possessed and held in Denver the technology that was required for the
construction of the Scheme.

This was stored in its people, its docunnentation,

and its work nnethods and practices. The USBR had the experience, expertise
and the capacity to assist.

By the early 1950s the USBR had achieved a significant reputation
worldwide for its engineering achievennents, including engineering design
and supervision of construction, particularly involving structures of large
size and complexity. These achievements included bridges, canals and open
channel systems, dams, communications, earth structures, foundations,
flood control, pipelines, highways, power generation transmission and distribution, surveying and mapping, tunnels and water systems.

In the fifty

year history up to 1950 its engineering achievements included the Hoover
Dam (highest dam), Grand Coulee Dam (largest concrete dam), Shasta
Dam (second highest dam), Anderson Ranch Dam (highest earthfill dam),
Friant-Kern Canal (longest irrigation canal). Grand Coulee Feeder Canal
(largest irrigation canal), All-American Canal System (longest integrated
canal system in operation), Alva B. Adams Tunnel (longest irrigation tunnel),
Grand Coulee Power Plant (largest hydro-electric power plant), and Grand
Coulee Pumping Plant (largest pumping plant).[2j

As a result of its reputation in the field of design and construction
of structures of unprecedented size and complexity, the Bureau of Reclamation
had during the period to 1930 assisted private engineering firms, state
and local government agencies, and the departments of Government in
their engineering undertakings.

In general this technical assistance consisted

of consulting services on basic designs, preparation of designs and specifications
for structures, and laboratory research.

Some examples of this work included

studies, planning, preparation of designs, specifications and construction
drawings, and technical assistance for construction of Falcon Dam, a
13,000,000 cubic yard earthfill structure on the Rio Grande between the
United States and Mexico, for the International Boundary and Water
Commission; tests of samples of Barite aggregate for concrete, and tests
of drill samples at Eniwetok Proving Grounds for the Atomic Energy
Commission;

hydraulic model tests for flood protective works at Morrison,

Colorado for the US Department of the Army;

basic research in the

development of lightweight concrete for the Housing and Home Finance
Agency;

design of Madden Dam and Power Plant for the Panama canal;

and design of Norris and Wheeler Dams and Power Plants for the Tennessee
Valley Authority.[3j

In addition to these projects the USBR provided assistance to foreign
countries in various fields of water resource use and developments including
irrigation, hydro electric power, drainage and comprehensive basin developments.

These included preparation of designs and estimates for Yangtze

Dam, power plant and navigation facilities, Yangtze River Basin for the
Republic of China;

trial load and stability analysis of the proposed 780

foot high concrete Kosi Dam for the Central Water Power, Irrigation and
Navigation Commission, Government of India;

testing of Australian-made

cement in connection with construction of the Warragamba Dam for the
Metropolitan Water, Sewerage and Drainage Board of New South Wales;
and embankment material tests for Hirakud Dam, India, and Gal Oya
Dam, Ceylon, for the International Engineering Company.[^J

On the 1 February 1931, there were at the Reclamation Engineering
Centre 780 engineers in the following specialities:

Civil, mechanical, electrical,

electronics, materials, safety, structural, hydraulic, construction, chemical,
production and programs, architectural, and general. Other specialists
included chemists and petrographers, geologists, hydrometeorologists, inspectors,
physicists, geophysicists, architects and technical illustrators.
Engineering expertise is usually not only a product of experience
but also of the availability of facilities where research and development
can be undertaken.

In this latter respect the Reclamation Engineering

Centre in Denver facilitated the resolution of many complex design problems
by the Bureau engineers and designers.

One example of this equipment

was the A-C network analyzer used by the electrical engineers to study
in miniature the planning, design and operating problems of complex power
systems.

The characteristics of the electric power system to be studied

were simulated by appropriate values of resistance, reactance, and capacitance
on the units making up the analyzer.

In a complex electrical network

many quantities are difficult if not impossible to determine by mathematical
calculations.

The network analyzer reduced the unknowns and allowed

engineers to determine much more closely the actual needs of the proposed
power system. In the design of new power systems, which was one of the
many uses of the analyzer, the Bureau had accomplished savings of many
hundreds of thousands of dollars by the elimination of transmission line
sections and closer design of other equipment over that which would have
been thought necessary with ordinary planning methods.[5j

Another facility used directly in design was the photoelastic laboratory
where the most modern photoelastic and analogy apparatus of that time

was available for use in solving a wide variety of design problems.

Photoelastic

and analogy methods are very useful when analytical solutions to design
problems are too time-consuming or are extremely difficult.

Equipment

available included the photoelastic polariscope, Babinet compensator, and
photoelastic interfrometer for studies of stresses in two-dimensional structural
models;

the scatter polariscope and electric ovens for studying stresses

in three-dimensional models; the Beggs deformeter for studying statically
indeterminate structures of the f r a m e type; and the electric analogy tray
and membrane analogy for studying a wide variety of problems involving
steady-state potential flow and hydrodynamic e f f e c t s of earthquakes amongst
other things.

Also available was an earthquake analyzer for subjecting

a structure (represented by a torsional pendulum with similar
characteristics) to known recorded earthquakes.

elasticity

A reflex integraph was

available for solving complicated differential equations accurately and
rapidly.[6j

In engineering choice [7j there evolves a norm or range of best practices
that serves as a guide to the replication of technology under similar circumstances.

It was these practices and techniques that the Authority looked

for assistance in planning and constructing the Upper Tumut section of
the Scheme.

The minimum program for technical assistance services was initially
to comprise design and specification work to a stage where contract bids
could be called for the Adaminaby-Tumut Pond Tunnel (including access
adits and shafts, portals and control works), Tumut Pond Dam, and the
tunnel from Tumut Pond to the surge tank (including intake portal, surge
tank and access adit).

In accordance with the provisions of Section ^ of the Agreement,
the Authority forwarded prelinninary infornriation regarding field data and
results of investigations relating to the projects the Bureau was to carry
out.

These included extracts from the surveying and plan catalogue relating

to the Upper Tumut River and Adaminaby areas, contour plans of the dam
site and saddles adjacent to the dam site, river cross sections, tunnel portal
site survey, Tumut Pond dam site surveys, T1 site and Tumut River downsteam
survey, T1 Power Station contour plan, Tumut Pond Catchment contour,
contour plan T1 and Tumut River Downstream, Adaminaby Storeage Area
contour plan, topographic maps of the Kiandra and Snowy Plains areas,
and Tumut Pond and T1 triangulation diagram.

These were complemented

by aerial photographs of the Tumut Valley below Tumut Pond, upstream
of Tumut Pond to Power Station T1 site, and the tunnel line Adaminaby
to Tumut Pond. Reports included a summary of the Adaminaby-Tl Project
investigations including a general description of the Scheme, a discussion
of the suggested construction layout for the Adaminaby-Tumut Pond Tunnel,
preliminary report of the geological investigations for the T1 Project,
estimates of flood flow and general hydrological information, climatological
information, a survey of sources of sand and concrete aggregate within
the Adaminaby-Tl area, and importantly approximate unit rates for estimating
as at November 1951.

Capacity curves for both the Adaminaby Dam and

Tumut Pond were also sent. [8J

This information was reviewed by the Chief Engineer of the Bureau
and his staff who indicated that although the information supplied was
a general indication of conditions for the works under consideration, it
was inadequate as a basis for the accurate preparation of designs and specifications suitable for contract bids.

It was thus considered desirable for

selected Bureau personnel to proceed to Australia at an early date in order
to confer with the Authority on the work to be carried out by the Bureau
and to assist in the planning and compilation of investigation data and
the carrying out of investigations for this work.

Bureau representatives,

it was suggested, should include officers skilled in construction material
investigation and engineering geology, dam investigations and design, and
tunnel investigation and designs.

The most convenient arrangement was

for the Bureau to send a senior officer of wide experience able to co-ordinate
and control the activities of other officers specially skilled in the above
areas. Those selected to visit Australia were Messrs W A Dexheimer and
A B Reeves, both having had wide experience on tunnels, whilst Messrs
3 3 Hammond and R Rhoades were the Bureau's Senior Engineers in concrete
dams and geology respectively. [9J All arrived in Australia during February
1952. Their visit was greatly appreciated and undoubtedly helped the Authority
in formulating its immediate program of works, "and getting things under
way expeditiously". [lOj

In addition to these engineers, Dr 3 L Savage who assisted in the
original discussions and negotiations between the SMA and USBR, and Mr
F C Walker the senior engineer of the earth dam section of the Bureau,
who were both in Australia at that time, took part in site inspections and
discussions regarding the Tumut Pond Damsite, from the 16 to 23 February
1932.

The preliminary design layouts prepared by the Bureau based on
information supplied by the Authority were brought to Australia by Dexheimer.
He also brought with him estimates for alternative layouts in relation

to Tumut Pond Dam, which were based on similarly situated jobs in the
USA, and schedules of quantities for the various layouts so that unit rates
could be inserted by the Authority and estimates prepared for Australian
conditions.

At this time the Authority was advised that it was necessary to
prepare a report setting out the operational studies in relation to T1 Power
Station.

Several typical reports prepared by the Bureau for similar work

were sent to the Authority to be used as a 'reference' during the preparation
of the Authority's report, [ l l j The work to be designed by the Bureau
was to be based on this operational report.

From the commencement of training and technical assistance by
the Bureau to December 31, 1952, cost was $315,^50, made up as follows:
Overhead charge (in accordance with the Agreement)

$ 500

Adaminaby Tunnel - preparation of designs and eng.spec's

80 000

Tumut-Tl Tunnel -

"

"

"

"

30 000

Tumut Pond Dam -

"

"

"

"

"
"

90 000

Preliminary work leading up to preparation of final
designs and specifications

100 000

2 trainees for 6 months arrived 26.11.51
2

"

" 1 2 months

k

"

"

k

"

" 1 1

"

"

"

685

"

1 370

to arrive January 1952

" to arrive February 1952

Assignment of 4 Bureau Engineers to Australia for 60 days
Grand Total:

2 735
2 510
1 650
$315 ^50

In all cases the specifications were patterned after Bureau specifications [12j with no attempt to modify them for any Australian conditions.
This arrangement proved quite satisfactory to the Authority. [13J
The first of the designs and contract plans for work on the Upper
Tumut River were received in January 1953. In his letter [l^J conveying
the Authority's deep appreciation of the help the Bureau was giving both
in the preparation of designs and in the training and experience Authority
engineers were receiving, Hudson foreshadowed that the Bureau might
consider the execution of additional design work, and the secondment of
two engineers with extensive experience in the construction of large dams,
tunnels and associated works, and in the supervision and administration
of large contracts.
Hudson further wrote to the USBR on 1 June 1953 [15j following
up discussions between Lang (SMA) and Dexheimer and Reeves during their
visit to the Snowy Mountains area in March 1953, and his letter of 19
January 1953, advising that it was proposed to ask the Bureau to carry
out detailed designs and drawings in connection with those works of the
Upper Tumut developments for which it had already prepared specification
designs and contract drawings. These works were the Eucumbene-Tumut
Tunnel, the Tumut Pond Dam and T1 Pressure Tunnel and Surge Tank.
In addition, it was hoped that the Bureau would have been able to undertake
further work in connection with the T2 Project which was immediately
downstream of the T1 development on the Tumut River, and it was probable
that there would be other projects, such as the Kosciusko Dam, that the
Authority would seek Bureau assistance with. This was additional to the
review of the designs of Adaminaby Dam and the actual designs and specifications for the permanent outlet gates of that dam being constructed

by the NSW Public Works Department on behalf of the Authority which
it had earlier requested the Bureau to do. He requested the Bureau to
also prepare detailed Design Reports, Designer's Operating Instructions
and Perfornnance Specifications for the gates, valves and other mechanical
installations for the work which the Bureau has already designed for the
Authority. [16j

It had become obvious that the Bureau was playing a signficant role
in the design stages and this in turn was allowing the Scheme to rapidly
develop. With the view that such assistance should continue, Hudson advised
that the immediate program of works, additional to that already authorised,
that the Authority would want the Bureau to carry out was at least equivalent
to that which had already been carried out on its behalf. Similarly, the
SMA was anxious to continue the in-service training scheme.

Hudson still held the view that the Authority was weak in certain
areas and pressed the Bureau to second several engineers with extensive
experience in the construction of large dams, tunnels, power stations and
associated works to strengthen the Authority's staff engaged on the supervision
and administration of large contracts.

This would embrace a very senior

engineer who would be capable of co-ordinating the Authority's construction
and design work, keeping in mind the major contracts which were to be
awarded towards the end of 1953, as well as several other engineers who
could assist on major sections of the work or act as project engineers
for the major contracts.

Hudson saw the continuance of technical assistance by the Bureau
as a vital factor in enabling the Authority:

. to implement the very large program of work, which it is carrying
out for the Australian Government in the immediate future. This assistance
will also enable the Authority to consolidate its organisation so as
to cope with the very much greater volume of work required to bring
the Snowy Mountains Scheme to completion".(p.2)[17j
Lineweaver replied that the Bureau could see no reason why they
would or should not be able to take care of the work and other activities
outlined by Hudson. [18J
Hudson followed up the issue of seconded engineers with an alternative
proposal to that already mentioned. [19J This alternative was for a senior
engineer to undertake the overall direction and administration of all construction
work, i.e. both major contracts and work being done by the Authority forces;
a senior engineer to take charge of design and the scientific services
group (research); and up to 3 engineers who would work under the senior
engineer acting as project engineers for the main contracts. It was at
this time that Mr W A Dexheimer, who had visited the Scheme on several
occasions to provide advice and a liaison service, was appointed Commissioner of the USBR. The Authority was thus in the fortunate position
of having in the senior officer of the Bureau someone who had first hand
experience of the Scheme's design, its location and geography and its resources.
On 23 October 1933 the USBR confirmed that it would assist the
Authority in performing designwork for the T2 Project (as discussed during
Hudson's visit to Washington and Denver) in accordance with recent correspondence to Lineweaver and McClellan. Work on the general layout
of the project would commence as soon as the basic information and re-

commendations were received.

The Bureau also confirmed the assignment

of senior engineering personnel to serve with the Authority:
. to assist in its program of construction of large dams, tunnels, power
stations and associated works and its supervision and administration
of the associated contracts", (p.l) [20]
These advisors arrived in Australia during 1953.

Following discussions between the Authority and the water conservation
authorities of NSW and Victoria towards the end of 1953 it became apparent
that the Authority was able to divert water from the Tooma to the Tumut
River at a much earlier date than was originally planned.

This necessitated

certain changes to the Authority's design and construction programs, which
were to be discussed in detail in Australia with Mr H Bahmeier, the Bureau's
Senior Engineering Advisor and his associates, before finalising the forward
program and defining the work to be carried out by the Bureau.

It was not

anticipated that this would cause any change in the overall magnitude of the
work, and a further $1^0 000 had been sent to the U.S. State Department
to cover the immediate needs of the Bureau [21J in accordance with the
agreed financial arrangements.

Following detailed investigations and discussions regarding the T2
project which consisted of a diversion dam, a headrace tunnel with intake
structure, headrace tunnel surge chamber, twin pressure shafts and power
station, tailrace tunnel, surge chamber and tailrace tunnel, it was decided
by the Authority that the work should be split, the Authority's forces designing
the pressure shafts, the power station, and the spillway gates on the diversion
dam, and the Bureau providing a general review of the proposed layout

of the project;

the preparation of the designs and contract and construction

drawings for all civil engineering works associated with T2 Diversion dam,
intake and headrace tunnel, Headrace Tunnel Surge Chamber, Tailrace Tunnel
Surge Chamber and Tailrace Tunnel;

preparation of designs and drawings

for all structures associated with the above works, with the exception of
the spillway gates on the Diversion Dam;

and the preparation of draft clauses

for the technical specifications relating to works designed.

To assist with

the portion of the Bureau's assignment, the Authority sent them the Report
on Investigations into the T2 Project, Regional and Project geology reports,
alternative site proposal, status of geological investigations as at 21 March
1935, analysis of water in the Tumut River, concrete aggregates, hydrological
data, rating curves, drafting standards, photo-theodolite photographs, and
survey plans and negatives.

The Bureau advised its preparedness to assist

with the work with a preliminary cost estimate of $375 000 [23J.

Following a review of its program for the years 1955-57 the Authority
came to the conclusion [23j that it would be most advantageous to bring
the diversion of the Tooma River to the Tumut River forward so that
completion of the diversion virtually coincided with the completion of
the T1 Power Station towards the end of 1959.

This project consisted

essentially of a dam on the Tooma River and a diversion tunnel to the
Tumut River at Tumut Pond.

Originally, it was anticipated that this might

connect into the Eucumbene-Tumut Tunnel near Tumut Pond but later
studies showed that it was desirable to have a separate entrance to Tumut
Pond with a cross connection to the Eucumbene-Tumut Tunnel with appropriate
regulating valves and control gates.

It was proposed that the work could

be divided, by the Bureau undertaking the lower part of the tunnel, and
also the design and arrangement of the outlet to Tumut Pond and the

interconnections with the Eucumbene-Tunnut Tunnel.

This would involve

at least two control structures as well as the tunnel design.

Bureau officers

were familiar with the general layout of Tumut Pond and the lower end of
the Eucumbene-Tumut Tunnel, the design of which was carried out by the
Bureau.

The Bureau advised the Authority that in light of its heavy progrann,
there would be a limitation on the work they could perform.

They were

able to assist with the complete design and detailing of the gates or valves,
and operating equipment, with transmittal of completed tracings, together
with calculations, manufacturer's data on standard accessories, and drafts
of specifications.

These would be completed in the same manner and to

the same extent as for earlier projects however, if applicable existing Bureau
gate and hoist designs would be modified to suit in the same manner as
modifications to existing designs for spillway radial gates and hoists did for
outlet guard and regulating gates and hoists at T2 Diversion Dam were
contemplated.

They also prepared general informational data including

schematic diagrams of electrical wiring and hydraulic piping.[2^J

Local

control equipment for activating this was also designed and detailed, and
information relative to the telemetering and remote control equipment
was also developed.
The USBR proceeded to assist with 12 Project however this was not
without some problems.

After completion of the reinforcement drawings and

bar lists for the tunnels and tunnel structures on the Eucumbene-Tumut
and T1 Projects, the Bureau became concerned with the time and personnel
estimated to be required on similar work on the 12 Project tunnels and
tunnel structures. Its inability to engage qualified engineering personnel

together with their increased domestic work program forced the Bureau to
examine all available alternatives regarding staff and workload.

They

requested the Authority to assign six of their engineering trainees to Denver
for 8 to 10 weeks beginning approximately March 1957, to assist
the preparation of reinforcement drawings for T2 Project. [25J

with
This was

regarded as an excellent opportunity for them to gain experience in that
type of work and to become familiar with detail designs.

In regard to

the Tooma-Tumut diversion, designs were completed by October 1956 and
all reinforcement drawings and bar lists for concrete work were completed
by April 1957.

Designs on the T2 Project were actioned on the basis that

specification drawings were completed in November 1956 and final design
drawings by March 1957.
As design assistance on the Tumut 1 project was completed the
Bureau took on additional work from the Tumut 2 and other Snowy projects
though this was clearly more than had been envisaged in the initial approval
for assistance by the USBR.

This additional work included all drawings

and technical paragraphs to enable contracts to be called, design drawings
for the four adits (specifying location, size, grade and other details) and
terminus of the tunnel for the Adaminaby-Snowy Tunnel, at a cost of
$165 000, and complete stress analysis and preparation of all specification
drawings and technical paragraphs for the Island Bend Dam, at a cost of
$80 500.

This work was completed by the end of June 1958 [26j.

Other technical assistance provided by the USBR was based on specific
requests from the Authority which flowed from both sequential development
in planning of the Scheme, and from changes made to the design criteria
as a result of further investigations by Authority and USBR staff.

The

former category included design work for the Murrumbidgee-Eucumbene

Diversion, and the Snowy-Geehi Project [27J, a nine mile nominally unlined
tunnel with associated connections, shafts, gates, outlet structures and
adits, whilst the latter included modifications to construction drawings
for the Tumut 2 Diversion Dam and associated head and tailrace surge
tank structures, and outlet gates.

The design layouts both preliminary and final, schedules of quantities
for the various layouts, the use by the Authority of the 'typical reports'
as used by the Bureau, the use of the USBR model for specifications, completion
of detailed designs and drawings (as opposed to specification designs and
contract drawings), design reports, operating instructions, performance
specifications, construction drawings, completed tracings, calculations
and manufacturers data on standard accessories, modifications of existing
designs to suit, schematic diagrams for electrical wiring and hydraulic
piping, design and detail of control equipment, and development of relevant
information on telemetering and remote control equipment, were all examples
of a technical ability possessed by the Bureau in the USA, a source clearly
external to the area in which the technology was to be applied. This direct
assistance by the USBR enabled the transfer of the technology to the Scheme
and to Australia.

Without this process which was mainly confined to formal,

non interactive methods but also involved some personal contact, the construction of the Upper Tumut works would not have been able to continue
at the pace, both in terms of construction and sequence, that it did. It
is also a fact that construction and operation of the other parts of the
Scheme would not have been completed as they were without the application
by Scheme officers of principles, methods and techniques learned from
Bureau practices and procedures, and directly from USBR personnel.

The

Authority incorporated in its practices, the superior elements of Bureau
practice.
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THE UNITED STATES BUREAU OF RECLAMATION
ADVISORY TEAM IN AUSTRALIA
When the Snowy Mountains Authority was established in 19^9, [IJ
planning had been developed only to the stage of establishing the general
policy of water utilisation and of ensuring that the general proposal was
practically and economically sound.
The Authority thus had the task of preparing a strategy to achieve
the proper and economical construction of the Scheme [2J which included
detailed land, geological and hydrographical surveys to ascertain the basic
data as to topography, foundation conditions and water resources, and
the planning of the most economical full utilisation of the water resources
of the area.

The order and rate of construction had also to be planned

to ensure the early development of power to relieve existing shortages,
the most economical operation of the hydro stations in conjunction with
existing thermal stations, that power would be produced in stages suitable
for absorption by the existing power systems of New South Wales and Victoria,
and the early inland diversion of Snowy waters to increase irrigation supplies.
Inherent in this strategy was planning for and of the economical
sizes and types of structures such as sizes of tunnels, heights and types
of dams, capacities of racelines, transmission voltages; the location and
nature of access roads and of location and layout of townships, workshops
and other buildings for construction purposes;

and the most economic

construction methods and procedures for construction plant, equipment
and the provision of power for construction purposes.

The Scheme is a complex one both in regard to the types of engineering structures involved and in the nature of the river diversions [3J.

Particular features of the Scheme include the large amount of tunnelling
required, the underground location of many of the power stations and the
use of very high voltage transmission lines to convey the energy produced
to the load centres in NSW and Victoria. It should be noted here that this
330 000 volt transmission which formed an important link between the
power distribution centres of the states of Victoria and New South Wales
was the first of its kind in the southern hemisphere.

As early as April 19^9 it was foreshadowed that the Snowy River
Construction Authority as it was then known, would invite United States
experts whose knowledge covered the problem areas likely to arise on the
Scheme, to come to Australia, look over the project and tender advice.[^J
These problem areas were thought to cover the construction of dams, long
tunnels of major dimension through rock, and the installation of machinery
required for the development of hydro-electric power.

Indeed formal arrange-

ments had engineers of the USBR visiting the Scheme to assist with initial
design considerations.

These engineers included Assistant Chief Construction

Engineer, later Commissioner, of the USBR, Mr W Dexheimer, in November
1950, who returned in 1952 with Mr A E Reeves in connection with the
initiation of the first phase of the co-operative program between the USBR
and the SMA.

Both of these engineers had been in close contact with

the work as it had developed since 1930 [5j.

The first USBR Advisers arrived in Cooma early in 195^f.

The team

included Messrs H F Bahmeier as Senior Engineering Adviser, H R Orr as
Engineering Design Adviser, E C Higginson as Engineering Adviser, and
R B Ward and 3 R Walton as Construction Engineering Advisers, all of
whom had a close knowledge of the technologies to be introduced.

Following Associate Commissioner and Chief Engineer McClellan's
visit to Australia in June 195^, Commissioner Hudson [6j advised of the
awarding of the three major contracts for the UT Development works
and as a direct result of the visit, the re-organisation of some of the
Authority's work areas including the placement of the overall control and
co-ordination of the Major Contracts Division, Design Division and Scientific
Services Division under Mr I B Hughes as Chief Civil Engineer. The Bureau's
Senior Engineering Adviser, Mr H F Bahmeier, was assigned the role of
advising and assisting the Chief Civil Engineer in regard to the overall
control of these three Divisions with particular attention to the needs
and services not only of these Divisions, but also for the Upper Tumut
Development contracts.

Mr Orr, Engineering Design Adviser, was attached to the Design
Division, and Mr Higginson as Engineer Adviser to the Scientific Services
Division.

Messrs Ward and Walton, Construction Engineering Advisers,

were attached to the Major Contracts Division and were stationed at
Cabramurra to advise and assist the Senior Resident Engineer who was
in charge of the field supervision of the contracts.

It was originally proposed that there should have been a third construction
Engineering Adviser but it was finally decided that Messrs Ward and Walton
could satisfactorily carry out the necessary field supervision work.

At

that time it was anticipated that the contractors would establish their
main offices in the field, probably in the vicinity of Cabramurra.

Kaiser-

Walsh-Perini-Raymond who were awarded the contracts for the EucumbeneTumut tunnel and the Tumut Pond Dam, established their main office at
Cooma with field offices at Eucumbene Portal, Junction Shaft and Cabramurra,

however, whilst the French group had their main office in the field near
Cabrannurra.

This undoubtedly complicated effective communciations,

field supervision and contract administration.

In light of this and the lack

of experience of the Authority's engineers in handling contracts of the
magnitude of those for the T.l works, it became more obvious to Hudson,
as the detailed organisation for the administration of the contracts developed,
that there was a pressing need for a contract administration engineer to
assist the Major Contracts Division at Cooma and to expedite the engineering
work required to properly service the contracts.[7j The resignation of
one of the

Authority's senior engineers experienced in tunnel construction

and who had been allocated to the Eucumbene-Tumut Tunnel, necessitated
Messrs Ward and Walton spending all their time in the field advising and
training the Authority's engineers in field work and assisting the senior
resident engineer at Cabramurra.

As a result they could not, as had been

hoped, spend some of their time in Cooma. In addition the majority of
t h e Authority's engineers associated with the contracts were placed in
field positions, leaving only relatively junior and inexperienced engineers
available for contract administration duties at Head Office in Cooma.

Hudson pressed the Bureau to make available an engineer with experience
in contract administration and construction management.

Such an appointment

he argued ". . . would provide much needed training for the Authority's
personnel in the administration and management of the T.l contracts and
would assist in building an organisation that would later operate without
Bureau assistance. . ." (p.2)[8j Hudson's experience with USBR staff whilst
on the Warragamba Dam project may well have led to his conviction that
personal interaction greatly assisted the more formal means of communication
and training.[9j This engineer was to take the role of a Construction

8if
Management Consultant whose duties were to aid, advise and guide Australian
personnel who had the following responsibilities in contract administration:
preparation of extra work orders, change orders, findings of fact and correspondence connected therewith;

recommend to the Divisional Head approval

or disapproval of contractors' claims;

review notices of delay and requests

for extension of time under construction contracts;

make initial determination

as to whether delay was excusable on the basis of facts found;

review

contract payment schedules for major items of construction plant and
equipment;

analysis of contractor's anticipated production schedules and

r a t e of encumbrance of funds under the contract;

recommend organisational

changes to achieve better co-ordination with the activities of the Civil
Design and Scientific Services Divisions; and supervise estimating and
cost analysis sections and participate in conferences with representatives
of the contractor relative to all contract matters.

In addition they were

to prepare or supervise the preparation of correspondence in reply to enquiries
from contractors and field offices for interpretation or clarification of
contracts and specifications. The making of field trips in connection with
these duties for the purpose of advising and guiding field officials in the
preparation of data and contract modification documents, claims, procedures,
relationships with contractors regarding claims, and installation and maintenance
of proper claims procedure and related work was also involved.

There

were no direct administrative or supervisory responsibilities, rather they
were of an advisory and training nature only.

On 1 October 195^f, McClellan advised [lOj that Mr J D Seery, Assistant
Construction Engineer at Folsom California, had been selected to fill the
position of Construction Management Engineer.

Seery had been associated

with Bahmeier on several Bureau construction jobs in the past both within
the USA and abroad.

As the 2-year period for which USBR officers had been loaned to
the Authority expired early in 1956, it was decided that the Authority
should seek an extension by 12 months for three or four of the USBR officers
associated with contract administration and the remaining two or three
experienced design engineers to assist in strengthening the Design Division[llJ
of the Authority.

This was subsequently approved by the USBR although

there had been changes in the USBR staff in America who had knowledge
of the Scheme.

The duties and relationships of the engineering advisers

attached to the Authority changed with the effluction of time, but only
with the agreement of the USBR. In November 1955 Assistant Commissioner and Chief Engineer of the USBR McClellan agreed that the engineering
advisers should have somewhat altered roles to reflect the changing requirements of the Authority.[12j

Whilst it is doubtful that the Engineering Advisors thought of themselves or were thought of by others as formal agents of transfer, there
can be little doubt that their roles were to encourage and facilitate the
introduction of processes, practices and techniques used by the USBR that
were appropriate to the Australian situation.
Mr H F Bahmeier Senior Engineering Adviser, and Head of the team,
who had been with the Authority since 195^ and whose assignment continued
to 17 February 1958, was responsible for supervising and implementing
Bureau policies and procedures in relation to other engineering advisers.
He also advised the Public Works Department of NSW on the design and

construction of Adaminaby Dam and acted as Chairman of the Liaison
Conferences between the Public Works Department and the Authority.
With the assistance of Mr J D Seery he maintained liaison with the Bureau
of Reclamation on the design work being carried out by the Bureau for
the Authority.

In regard to construction, his attention was directed primarily

to Adaminaby Dam, Tooma Dam, and to all construction works in progress.

Mr 3 D Seery, Construction Management Adviser, whose assignment
terminated on 6 March 1937 acted as assistant to Bahmeier in relation
to liaison functions between the Bureau and the Authority on design work
being carried out by the Bureau and advised and assisted in regard to contract
administration, specifications, and office engineering and general contract
administration.

Stationed at Cooma, he assisted Bahmeier with regard

to advice on both the Adaminaby and Tooma Dams.
Messrs P von der Lippe and F E Cornwell, Engineering Advisers
on Design (whose assignments terminated on 5 March and 10 May 1938
respectively) were responsible for aiding and advising the Authority in
the e f f e c t i v e planning, co-ordination, and execution of design work.

Although

certain designations were originally mentioned in the assignments for these
officers (power stations for Von der Lippe, and dams and tunnels for Cornwell),
it was considered by the Authority that it was to their advantage for these
advisers to be attached generally to the Engineer-in-Charge, Civil Engineering
Design, rather than be segregated into the Power Stations and Dams and
Tunnels Branches.

This enabled full advantage to be taken of their individual

skills and experience.

Cornwell's experience in special and scientific studies

with the Bureau enabled him to provide valuable advice and assistance
in co-ordinating the work of the Scientific Services Division with the

design and construction areas of the Authority to achieve maximum utilisation
of the facilities available in the scientific services area.

Similarly, Von

der Lippe's broad experience in the design and construction of power stations
and other works enabled him not only to give valuable assistance to the
Power Station Branch, but also to advise in relation to the co-ordination
of this work with other design and construction operations.

The final member of the team, Mr F Goerhing, the Engineering Adviser
Construction, was stationed at Cabramurra and acted as general construction
adviser to the Engineer-in-Charge of Major Contracts, in connection with
the administration of the contracts for the Upper Tumut development.
The functions of the Advisory Team, in general terms, comprised
advice, assistance and guidance to Authority staff in the execution of the
Authority's program of design and construction work. No direct supervision
of design and construction activities was undertaken, however it is clear
that their role encompassed supervision in a de facto sense by encouragement
and suggestions of correction and variation to practice.
Specifically, the assistance and guidance provided by the Advisory
Team can be said to fall into the categories of organisation structure,
contracts and contract administration, construction supervision, pre and
post construction planning, training and co-ordination.

Organisation Structure

In the early days of its operation the Authority's organisation structure,
whilst not typical of Statutory Authorities[13j, reflected the areas of its
main concerns, investigation, assembly and completion of design data.

preparation of specifications for each development (at this early stage it
was the Tumut 1 developnnent) and the completion by day labour forces
of access roads, accommodation, and the electrical and communications
sytems which were necessary to enable the initiation of large scale operations
on construction of permanent works.
With the commencement of work under large contracts, due significantly to Advisory Team recommendations, the first of several important
re-organisational steps was made in May 195^. A Major Contracts Division
was established and a Chief Civil Engineer appointed to exercise general
control and co-ordination over activities of the Civil Design, Scientific
Services and Major Contracts Divisions. This also led to consolidation of
other Divisions.

Suggestions and advice concerning the functional organisa-

tion of the new Major Contracts Division were specifically requested from,
and were provided by, the Advisory Team.

This was especially so with

regard to the proposed field organisation for the supervision of Tumut
1 Project contracts[l^J.

The Authority originally contemplated that the field organisation
for the supervision of these contracts would contain three independent
groups, one for each contract. The Advisors however recommended that
all three contracts be administered by one Senior Resident Engineer located
at Cabramurra (the Regional township and headquarters for the Upper
Tumut construction), from where all office engineering and clerical functions
required for the three contracts would be performed. They further recommended
that there should be, responsible to the Senior Resident Engineer, Resident
Engineers and inspection crews in charge of work under the individual
contracts at specified geographic locations.

These recommendations were

accepted by the Authority and in addition to the Cabramurra headquarters,

resident engineering offices were established at Junction Shaft to supervise
contract 20,002, and two at Cabramurra to supervise contracts 20,003
and 20,00^.

Other assistance was provided to the Authority by the Advisors

with respect to general staffing requirements.

Team member P Von der

Lippe for example advised that concrete outline and reinforcement drawings
for the Tumut 1 Project would total some 153 drawings which translated
to ^59 man-weeks (153 x 3 man-weeks per drawing) and if they were to
be completed within 26 weeks then 18 people were required.

Given that

the workforce was 10, 8 more were needed if the construction schedule
was to be maintained.[16j
In addition to field offices, the Advisory Team were instrumental
in the establishment of field laboratories to deal with contracts.

The

establishment of these field control laboratories followed the Advisory
Team's preparation of plans, policies and techniques based on their USBR
experience.

Indeed the plans prepared for the construction of a laboratory

at Cabramurra were substantially altered because of team recommendations,
from the construction of a new building to remodelling of an existing facility
which resulted in a considerable cost saving.[16j
Recommendations were also made with regard to the overall arrangements
and requirements for engineering laboratories with the result that the
Hydraulic, Chemistry, Geology and Photographic Laboratories and workshops
were finalised and constructed consistent with USBR practices and avoiding
unjustifiable laboratory luxuries.[17j
In addition to broad recommendations for physical improvements
many discussions with laboratory personnel of all grades took place at
which the techniques of laboratory testing and research and development

as used by the USBR were described and referred to.

Considerable technical

information and data was obtained from the USBR by the team for use
by Authority personnel.

Much emphasis was placed on the value of working,

as a first priority, on those practical problems which directly assisted
in the investigation, design, preparation of specifications, and construction
of each feature of the project.

In the same way the Advisory Team encouraged

Authority staff to perform library research on relevant subjects to obtain
the best advice and record what had been done elsewhere before launching
off on an expensive and hurried plan to solve in a short time and in a
novel way, a problem that had been successfully solved elsewhere.
Further organisational changes, directed towards improvement of
service, changing needs, and better inter-divisional co-ordination, were
made by the Authority over a period of time, based on recommendations
and influence [18J of the Advisory Team members.

The Advisors were also commissioned [19J by the Authority to

complete

a comparative study of costs and staffing between the USBR and the Authority.
Using budget documents, progress reports and other supplementary data
a comparison was made and utilised by the Authority in considerations
regarding structures, levels and organisational mechanics.[20j

Not all the Advisory team's recommendations were adopted however.
No amount of influence, argument or examples based on USBR experience
succeeded in persuading the Authority to devolve overall technical control,
records and associated procedures to regional operations.[22j
maintained in Cooma head office.

These were

Contracts and Contract Administration
The history of civil engineering contracting in Australia is not a
long one. At least until the late 1930s, the econonny was not in a position
to make available large amounts of capital. What did become available
came from State or Federal Governments whose policies committed them
to performing development work using day labour rather than contracts.[22j
Post war years in Australia however saw a major change in the development
and economic strength of the country. Population and investment grew as
did Government spending [23j on developmental works. Most construction
work in Australia though was still done by day labour forces, and what
contract work had been accomplished had generally been on a cost plus
fixed fee basis. Indeed the contracts for the construction of the initial
aspects of the Scheme, Guthega Dam and Munyang (Guthega) Power Station,
were of the cost plus fixed fee type covering both design and construction.
Advice from the USBR in America coupled with argument and experience
presented by the Advisory Team on site in Australia were major factors in
convincing the Authority that large scale construction works such as the
Scheme should be undertaken utilising a schedule of unit prices contract as
opposed to the cost plus fixed fee type. The Tumut 1 Project contracts
were the first large scale construction works undertaken by the Authority
under a schedule of unit prices.[2^J
Cost plus fixed fee contracts provide for a fixed sum to be paid
to a contractor in addition to the actual cost of the work. This often
provides an inducement to speed and economise, for every delay keeps
the contractor from another job, ties up plant, and increases overhead

costs which must be met from the f e e .

This type of contract has the

advantage on difficult and hazardous jobs where the risks are great, that
tenderers need not bid high to cover themselves against possible loss.
It also lends itself to the situation whereby the cost of the job can exceed
its agreed estimated cost.[23j

Schedule of unit prices or schedule of rates

contracts on the other hand are those in which the contractor carries out
various clearly defined classes of work at stipulated unit rates.

The work

to be done is scheduled as accurately as the quantities can be estimated,
but the actual quantities are measured in the completed work and paid
for at the prices stated in the tender.

These are therefore the fairest

type of tender for both parties [26j in terms of costs, payments, speed
of job and quality of work.
In light of the fact that construction of major works by unit price
contracts was a new field in Australia, and that the Authority was pioneering
this field, the assistance of the Advisors and the application of the Advisory
Team's experience based on similar Bureau of Reclamation work proved
to be of invaluable assistance in the successful use of such contracts.

As mentioned the Authority pioneered the use of unit-price contracts
in Australia and as a result had to change the emphases placed on many
aspects of its procedures and practices, not the lease of which was a greatly
increased emphasis on good specifications containing complete design detail.
The Advisory Team placed great emphasis on this aspect and stressed the
possibilities of conflicts, delays, inferior workmanship and increased costs
resulting from déficiences and/or the omission of complete design details
from the specifications.

These results had been demonstrated under contract

No. 20,00^, where early construction of access roads was required but

where alignment and other design details were not included in the specifications. Because of this lack of design details, the work cost more than
originally contemplated, took longer to accomplish, and required excessive
administrative attention.

Lack of firm structure layouts and dimensions

for T.l Power Station was another case.[27j
The Authority's officers as a result became more aware of the need
for completing designs before calling for tenders.

Indeed in the preparation

of drawings and specifications for the Tumut 2 Project and the Tooma-Tumut
Diversion[28j, every e f f o r t was made to develop firm project arrangements
and structure layouts which were unlikely to require extensive changes
a f t e r commencement of construction.
The Authority at this time also had a weakness in detail design.
The Advisory Team stressed [29j the necessity for thorough investigations
of physical facts pertinent to construction of the various features of each
project, timely programming of all features and adequate designs and
specifications, in order to avoid the necessity for changes during the
administration of the contract.

One method developed for avoiding such

modifications and changes based on the Team's emphasis was the then
Chief Civil Engineer's requirement that design sections submit with their
construction drawings, estimates of costs for all alterations and/or changes
involved therein.

This procedure allowed for careful review of all proposals

which were at variance with the contract and specifications.

The Advisory Team was also instrumental in getting schedules set
up for production of construction drawings and procurement of material and
equipment to be furnished by the Authority and installed by the contractors.
The Officer of the Civil Design Group who had responsibility for these

schedules collaborated with both the Electrical and Mechanical Division
and the Major Contracts Group, to ensure effective co-ordination of e f f o r t .

The Authority had instituted an arrangement early in its development
whereby monthly meetings were held with the contractors and senior s t a f f .
These meetings which were attended by members of the Advisory Team,
assisted greatly in the development of a co-operative atmosphere and in
the prompt and businesslike exchange of information and service by the
parties involved.

Here the negotiations concerning extras and changes

were initiated and discussed.

When agreements were reached, the preparation

and issuance of contract modifications proceeded rapidly.[30j These documents
insofar as possible were patterned after the USBR's. The rough drafts
were prepared in the field offices and forwarded to the Cooma Head Office
for review, approval and final printing. Claims were handled in the same
manner. Advisory Teams' assistance being given in all phases of the negotiations
and preparation of documents.

Field assistance was provided on a full time basis, attention being
given to achievement of schedules, inspections, reports and records, safety,
construction procedures and interpretation of specifications.
Suggestions and recommendations regarding organisation and personnel
for field administration of contracts were also issued from time to time
in order that a uniformity of inspection, workmanship and quality of construction
could be achieved.

The range of areas covered by USBR advisors in the general field
of contracts and contract administration was therefore very broad and

included policy matters, the development of standard operating procedures,
and the insistence on close attention being paid to general and technical
details for application to the construction and supply contracts.

This latter

aspect included the need for closer examination of tenders to determine
whether the contractor possessed the necessary finance, experience and
construction plant to complete the job in the specified time.[31J
Liaison and communication patterns and systems within the Authority's
organisation relative to contracts also received attention by the team,
to ensure the development of co-operation and team work within the various
sections.

Economical usage of materials was encouraged and in some cases

considerable savings were realised [32j by the use of locally available material
in lieu of imports from overseas.

Construction Supervision

Advisory Team assistance was also provided to Authority personnel
involved in inspection of construction work and the field administration
of the contracts.

Emphasis for field personnel was placed on the importance

of co-operating with contractors to the extent of assisting and permitting
them to carry out their work as efficiently and expeditiously as possible.
Inspectors were advised that although the work was to be performed in
full accord with the plans and specifications, their decisions should as
far as possible be fair and reasonable.

Probable and likely causes of contractual

difficulties were pointed out and advice given regarding methods of operation
by contractors, pitfalls to be avoided and means of counteracting 'tricks'
that contractors often tried.
was given included[33j:

Some of the main points on which advice

"(a)
(b)

To be thoroughly acquainted with contract drawings and specifications.
Avoid causing delays by failure to issue instructions, deliver detailed
construction drawings and Government furnished materials in enough
time.

(c)

Avoid unnecessary delays which cause the contractor extra work or
added costs.

(d) In all decisions and instructions to contractors, bear in mind that it
is results of work that are important, not methods of attaining the
results.
(e)

Be alert to unsafe practices or working conditions.

(f)

Keep good records of instructions given, causes of delays, extra work
performed, e t c , for later use, if needed, in preparation of findings
of f a c t , answering contractors' claims, litigation, e t c , and

(g)

In reviewing drawings submitted by the contractor for approval, the
prime requisite being to ascertain conformity with the specification."
(p.2)

In addition to providing the advice on construction supervision in
written form, team members attached to the various areas and projects
regularly assisted in, and commented on, the physical examination and
supervision of the projects under construction.

Construction Planning
The Advisors also gave Authority personnel assistance with the review
of contractors drawings and plans for camps, construction plant, tunnel

supports, and tunnel lining forms. Plans of the contractors' cement handling
plant at Cooma, the concrete aggregate processing plant at Happy Jacks,
and the plant for installing reinforcing steel and concrete tunnel linings
were specially considered in studies and discussions.
Contractors' construction programs were carefully reviewed by the
Advisory Team with particular attention being given to control or delivery
of Authority-furnished materials and construction drawings, conformity
with contract provisions, consistency, proper sequence of operation for
completion of the various items within the contract times, and e f f e c t
on administrative and program responsibilities.[3^J

Training
Closely related to the issue of construction planning and supervision
was that of training.

The training of Australian Engineers in America

by the USBR is dealt with in detail at a later section, however it must
be said that when they returned to Australia they, with continued field
assistance from the Advisory Team, did much to overcome problems in
the areas of inspection of works constructed under contract.

In addition to the overseas training, the Advisory Team encouraged
the Authority to undertake the in-house training of other personnel mainly
tradesmen as inspectors; a decision made easier by the shortage of suitably
trained and qualified personnel at that time.[35j

As had been the experience in the USA, these individuals proved
to be capable inspectors notwithstanding their lack of formal technical

training. The in-house courses conducted by the Authority to train inspectors
lasted approximately 3 nnonths consisting of lectures, tutorials, field exercises
and where applicable laboratory exercises. Courses conducted included
Survey A, and B, Field Hydrography, Welding and Radiography (for Inspectors),
Mechanical (for Inspectors), Excavation and Tunnelling (Inspectors), and
Concrete (for inspectors). In addition conversion courses, in Excavation
and Tunnelling, and in Concrete were given to inspectors already qualified
in another category.[36j The Snowy Mountains Authority trained with
nnarked success sonne 200 men in several fields of civil engineering in less
than three years, thereby reducing its demand for engineers[37j, due largely
to the recommendations and experience of the Advisory team.
Design and Co-ordination Assistance
Assistance with design and co-ordination of design both with work
performed in Australia and from the Denver Office of the USBR comprised
a major part of the Advisory Team's duties.
Assistance was given to the Chief Civil Designing Engineer and his
staff in organising and managing the Civil Design Division, planning, programming, and executing design work performed for the Authority in Denver.
This civil design work included review of the contractor's drawings for
the Guthega Project (designed by contractor); review of Bureau construction
drawings for Eucumbene-Tumut Project, Tumut Pond Dam and T.l Pressure
Tunnel; preparation of construction drawings for T.l Power Station; preliminary design of T.2 Project features; review of Bureau proposals for
final layout and design of T.2 Diversion Dam and T.2 Project waterways;

study of final layout of T.2 Power Station and adjacent structures; preparation
of specification drawings and text for Tooma-Tumut Diversion; and review
of the Bureau's proposal for the arrangement of the downstreann end of
the Tooma-Tunnut Tunnel.[38j
Specification drawings for T.l Power Station (Contract 20,004) were
also prepared. However, they were from unsufficient data base necessary
to determine firm structure layouts and diminsions, particularly data on
hydraulic and electrical equipment to be installed. This and other unforeseen
conditions encountered required a number of rather extensive modifications
to arrangement and design of the various features.[39j The Advisory Team
participated in studies, field inspections and discussions on these matters,
as well as design and layout studies for the other projects mentioned above.
In addition an important function of the Advisory Team was the coordination of design work performed in Australia with that performed for
the Authority in Denver. It should be noted that the office of Authority
Liaison Engineer in Denver was abolished in September 195^^ [40j, and from
that date the Bureau Design Engineering Advisor in Cooma was made responsible
for maintaining liaison with the Denver Office regarding design work.
From that time, excepting on matters of policy, all correspondence between
the Authority and the Bureau concerning exchange of technical information,
details of design work requested of the Bureau, studies and recommendations
from the Denver office on structure layout and design, transmittal of drawings
and draft specifications, revision of drawings, etc, were conducted through
the Senior Engineering Advisor.

The engineering advisors progressively ceased duty with the Authority
and returned to the USA during 1958. By the time they left design drawings
and specifications had been completed and contracts let for the major
part of the Upper Tumut project.

The role that these agents played in the successful transfer of technology should not be underestimated.

Their technical experience and

expertise was not challenged by Authority personnel and they were able
to assist in the smooth implementation of practices and policies based
largely on Bureau models, but modified where appropriate for Authority
purposes.

The close contact that was maintained by virtue of the Bureau's

engineers acting as liaison engineers between the USBR in Denver and
the Authority was a very important instrument in the mutual acceptance
of modifications to design and specifications which inevitably happen during
the life of a project.

Under the tutelage of the USBR advisors, Authority personnel rapidly
developed experience in contract administration, including the new unit-price
contracts, construction supervision and construction planning, both at the
detail and conceptual levels.

This ancillary training, education and experience

building all contributed to the successful transfer.

That the advisors came from a Government undertaking also assisted
in their ability to contribute immediately to the needs of the Scheme.
From their experiences they were aware of how Government structures
and bureaucracies functioned, of the financial and other resource constraints,
and of the communication and information channels through which results
were obtained.

There can be no doubt that the USBR Advisory Team contributed
significantly to the successful completion of the Upper Tumut works.
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AUSTRALIAN ENGINEERS IN TRAINING IN AMERICA
Just as the Scheme benefitted in terms of savings in costs and time
by having the Bureau advisors "in situ" in Australia, so too did it benefit
from having its own engineers in training with the USBR in Denver.

The shortage of skilled personnel in the areas required for the project,
contract administration, hydrology and gauging, site investigation, road
construction, dam design and construction, canals flumes and tunnels,
powerhouse sub and superstructures, power station plant and equipment,
switching stations, and transmission lines and distribution [IJ have been
mentioned previously.

Recognition of this shortage of skilled manpower

available in Australia coupled with the decision to recruit overseas and
the time lapse inherent in such recruitment led the Authority to include
in its negotiations with the USBR, training for selected Australian engineering
s t a f f . It was claimed that at this time the Bureau included amongst its
Denver staff some of the world's leading authorities in engineering and
related scientific fields, [2j, the majority of which matched the experience
requirements of the Authority for construction of the Scheme.

It is clear that the USBR possessed the technical knowledge and
capability required by the Authority for the successful development of
the Scheme.

This satisfied one half of a requirement [3J for the successful

transfer of technology;

that the source possess technical knowledge and/or

capability useful to the receiver. The other half of the equation, that the
receiver should have complementary knowledge and capability, should understand
the circumstances and potential contributions of the source, be able to
demonstrate interest, and support this with its own incentives, was not
capable of being immediately satisfied by the Authority because of its
lack of sufficient resources with the complementary knowledge and capability.

There can be little doubt that the organisation had begun to develop its
own incentives in terms of infrastructure and operating systems and that
it understood the contribution the USBR could make in both the technical
and training areas. In this latter regard the Authority decided to send
some 100 of its engineers [^J to study and train in the various aspects of
the USSR's operations and techniques in the period 1951 to 1939.
The recognition of the training role that the Bureau could play occurred
in the very early days of Scheme for even before the signing of the Agreement[5j which provided for the co-operative program of technical training
and assistance, the process of selecting trainees and the logistics of transport,
training, and training administration had begun. This is reinforced by the
fact that the first group of trainees arrived in Denver on 22 November
1951, a mere ten days after the signing of the Agreement. This was at
a time when security and customs clearances and entry visas for the USA
often took three months to process and approve.[6j
The practice of sending selected suitable personnel to study under
the supervision and guidance of more advanced organisations was not new
when it was first considered within the Authority. The USBR had been
training both American and foreign students across a large range of disciplines
for some time and at the time of the Authority's request was considering
requests from three other foreign countries.[7j This system with its emphasis
on training acknowledged the fact that in addition to the considerable
preparation and technical effort required to ensure that a technology was
successfully adapted to local conditions, that education, training and
development of individuals utilising the technology had to be carried out.
Vickery[8j, in support of this notion, holds the view that ancillary training,

education and experience building are the key to successful technology
transfer in that they must acconnpany and facilitate the smooth introduction
of international technology.
In addition to assisting in the understanding and comprehension of
a new technique or system, the benefits accruing to the organisation from
training and development include reduced learning time to reach acceptable
performance levels, improved performance on the present job, attitude
formation, resolution of specific operational problems and manpower needs[9j,
whilst the benefits to the individual include job enrichment, security, status,
and enhancement of market value.

Each of these factors were important

in their own way to the successful transfer of USBR technology to the
Scheme.

In any learning situation, including training, education, development
and experience building, there is a cumulative process in which individual
adjustment involves changes that reflect and are based on earlier experiences
and changes.

The individuals reaction in any learning situation is conditioned

and modified by what has been learned in earlier lessons and experiences[10j.
In order to ensure that appropriate experiences could be built on, the educational and experiential backgrounds of all Authority engineer trainees were
thoroughly examined prior to selection for overseas training to ensure
a close match between training course requirements and objectives and
trainee experience. The USBR was careful to tailor the training programs
to match the individual work situations and areas of concern as put forward
by the Authority in conjunction with the individual engineer.

The training

course syllabi were based to an extent on experience and intuitive analyses
of the desired behavioural objectives as well as the recognition that failure
to tailor courses was unlikely to yield successful results in the intermediate

and long t e r m s . [ l l j

The numbers involved and the training programs envisaged by both
the Authority and the Bureau changed dramatically in a relatively short
period of time, from the point where two or three of the Authority's bright
young engineers would be trained to gain experience in the Bureau's
methods[12j, through the Authority's preparedness to send up to twelve
engineers for training[13j, to the point where there was an acceptance
that training would take place during the period of time that the Bureau
provided technical assistance to the Scheme.[l^J

The overriding concern

being that the training program as finally determined between the Bureau
and the Liaison Engineer was of fundamental interest to the Authority
and that it was undesirable to sacrifice diversity of training to expediency
for a particular project.[15j

Having determined the training programs for each of the selected
trainees, these being directly related to the Authority projects being undertaken
at the time, the trainees were counselled on their obligations and the
Authority's expectations of their behaviour and performance. They were
expected to display the utmost diligence to their work and familiarise
themselves with all phases of the work on which they were engaged.

They

were instructed to pay particular attention to all aspects of design including
basic assumptions, loading conditions, and other special requirements because
on their return to Australia that knowledge would materially aid in carrying
out the works to their successful completion.[16j

The first Liaison Engineer, Pinkerton, arrived in Washington on 15
November 1951, and following discussions with the Foreign Activities

Section of the Bureau and officers of the Australian Embassy in Washington
proceeded to Denver on 22 November 1951.

The first group of four trainees

arrived in Denver on the same day and took up duties at the Bureau on
26 November 1951, ten days after the execution of the Agreement.[17j

The orientation program for these trainees (Messrs McConnell, Hunter,
Wilkin and Williamson) lasted five days and included introductions to senior
staff;

a tour of the engineering laboratories;

discussions on hydrology,

project planning, engineering geology, development of hydro electrical
projects and hydraulic machinery; location selection and design of dams;
a lecture and slide presentation on problems of grouting;
and tour of the Colorado-Big Thompson Project;

an explanation

and "the inevitable publicity

photographs".(p. 1 )[8J

All four trainees were civil engineers and as mentioned, training
programs were specially developed for each individual.

A.McConnell trained

in earth dams (3 months), spillways and outlets (3 months), materials laboratory
(1 month), and field assignments (1 month).

3. Williamson trained in spillways

and outlets (3 months), structures and tunnels (3 months), large gates and
valves (3 months), hydraulics laboratory (1 month), and field assignment
(2 months).

W. Wilken trained in foundations and grouting (3 months),

concrete dams (3 months), steel pipes and penstocks (3 months), concrete
laboratory (1 month), and field assignment (2 months), and 3. Hunter trained
in concrete dams

months), field assignment at Canyon Ferry (3 months)

and field inspection and special assignments (1 month).[19j

The second group of trainees comprising Messrs D. Walsh, R. Sanders,
A. Hosking and L. Endersbee, arrived in Denver and commenced their

respective training schedules on 21 February 1952. Walsh's program involved
hydrology project planning (3 months), field assignment and inspection
(2 months), and spillways (3 months);

Sanders involved project planning

(U months), field inspections (2 weeks) and concrete dams (3i months);
Hosking spent 3^ months in engineering laboratories, 2 months on earth
dams, 2 months on field assignments and inspection, and 2 weeks on special
assignments;

whilst Endersbee spent 6 months on tunnels and structures,

3 months on earth dams and 3 months on field assignments and inspections.
These training schedules were developed to permit the trainees to work
on various phases of the design work for the Tumut Pond Dam and associated
diversion systems.[20j Thus, in addition to gaining experience on general
USBR projects and work practices, the trainees specifically spent time
on relevant parts of the SMA project which at this early stage involved
mainly civil and hydrology works. These were also the areas in which
the Authority was most vulnerable from a resources point of view.

This practice was true also of the third group of trainees who arrived
in Denver during February 1932 with the following training schedules:
L.W. Gilmour and B.G. Hely, construction administration, field construction
with particular reference to supervision and administration of contracts,
and production control and scheduling; I.P. Sargeant, project planning as
related to the work carried out by the Authority's Investigations Division,
concrete dams and bridges, and field inspections;

and B.3. Hannon, studying

power station layout and design.

As the planning for the Scheme progressed and technical details for
each section of the project were finalised with the assistance of the USBR
technical advisors in Australia the requirements for training in

different areas and disciplines were identified, and trainees were selected
accordingly.

The first mechanical engineer trainee R.S. Franzi arrived

in Denver late in 1952 to train in the mechanical design of large gates
and valves, low head gates, and for field training and inspections. He was
accompanied by G F Millington, a structural engineer, who trained in hydraulic
design including the specialised subjects of surge tank design, water hammer
problems, and stability of hydraulic systems, the hydraulics laboratory,
mechanical design of gates, valves, penstocks and pipes and inspection.[21J
In addition his field assignment included office and design work in a regional
office, the organisation structure decided upon by the Authority for construction
of the Scheme.[22j During 1953 a further sixteen trainees left Australia
for Denver to study in such areas as construction and contract supervision
[23J, and administration, structural design, canal and project planning,
materials testing (especially concrete and steel), sediment control, sampling
technique and stream bed load movement.[2^J

Between November 1951 and December 195^, kl of the Authority's
engineers trained with the USBR and selected other US organisations as
arranged by the USBR. Training periods varied usually between eight and
twelve months, the latter period being for single trainees and the shorter
period for married trainees since wives were discouraged from going to
the USA with their husbands.

Estimates indicate that the cost per man

week of training during this period was L61.[25j

Contracts for major civil works let during this period included EucumbeneTumut Tunnel and Happy Jacks Dam, Tumut Pond Dam and Tumut 1 Pressure
Tunnel, all let to Kaiser-Walsh-Perini-Raymond, a joint venture between
four American companies with a contract value of $38m;

Tumut 1 Power

Ill
Station, Pressure shafts and Tailwater Tunnel let to a French group of
contractors with a value of $7.8m;

Tumut 1 Power Station Generators

(ASEA Electric (Aust) Pty Ltd, $2.2m); and Tumut 1 Power Station Turbines
(English Electric Co. Ltd $1.7m).[26j

As each of the contracts got under way there was an increased
requirement for skilled engineers experienced in contract administration
and supervision as well as the specialist disciplines associated with the
various parts of the works in progress.

Similarly as planning for new projects and the technical detail and
specifications for them became more advanced the requirements for training
varied, however the numbers being trained did not diminish.

It was recognised

that Australian engineers required training in less well known areas as
well as the more common disciplines and techniques.

As long as the USBR

was preparing the majority of technical specifications, operating procedures
and practices and instructions, it was considered that the Authority would
benefit significantly from having engineers trained by the USBR on these
projects and in USER methodology.

By 1958 the training thrust was noticeably broader due to the changing
styles of construction and the progress towards finalising some of the contracts
thus necessitating completion of wiring, and operations, protection and
control systems amongst others.

Training now involved design of tunnels,

power station design, specific hydrolography equipment including telemetering,
hydrographie forecasting techniques and methods, power plant, electrical
machinery and controls, and design of aqueducts.

The training program

for Mr R. Hilton, who left for Denver on 18 January 1958, provided a

good example of the specialisation of some of this training. In the broad
sense he was required to visit the USBR Earth Laboratory in Denver to
study Bureau classification test procedures, hydraulic and structural test
procedures, records systems, report writing and report production systems,
and to study and report on all new equipment and techniques. Specific
aspects of the program included the study of earth dam specification
requirements, processing of construction control test results from the field
and earth dam design, whilst in the Earth Dam Section; X-ray diffraction
of clays, selection of rock for rip-rap, rockfill, etc, and general petrography
in the Pétrographie Laboratory; and the observation of earthwork operations
on large cuts and fills, and the placement, compaction and test operations
on base and surface courses of flexible pavements whilst attached to the
California State Highway Department based in Sacramento.[27j
This increasing specialisation was increasingly evident in trainee
training after this time as a result both of the major contracts let and
subsequent work on them, and as a result of the finalisation of design
parameters for the other works to be carried out in the Upper Tumut stage
and the remainder of the Scheme. Whilst trainees still undertook studies
in the civil engineering disciplines increasing emphasis was being placed
on the electrical and mechanical disciplines and aspects of the operations
and control of the Scheme.
This was exemplified by training programs of Messrs C.W. Walker
(1958) and R.H. McKay (1959). Mr Walker, an electrical engineer, spent
9 months in the USA studying in the field of automatic high speed single
phase and three phase reclosure of transmission lines and of load and frequency
control.[28j This period included periods of time with both the Bonneville

Power Administration, and the Ontario Hydro-electric Power Commission.

Mr McKay, a mechanical engineer, undertook not only training with
the USBR in mechanical engineering design and field construction, but
also undertook witness testing of Tucker sno-cats and other over-snow
vehicles in Oregon, the observation of snow clearing practices and equipment
(with the Colorado Highway Department), and factory instruction on engines
and transmissions of caterpillar (Peoria, Illinois) and Allis-Chalmers (Springfield,
Illinois) heavy tractor and grader equipment.[29j

Thus as the technology required for the achievement of the optimum
solutions to specific situations varied with the situations, so too did the
training.

Eucumbene and Tooma Dams, the contracts for which were let in
May 1936 and May 1958 respectively, were earthfill dams, and the training
required by the Authority for its engineers on these projects differed from
the training required for its engineers on later dams which were concrete
arch (Tumut Pond), and concrete gravity (Tumut 2, Tantangara, and Happy
Jacks) dams.

From the commencement of the traineeship scheme in November
1951 until its cessation in January 1962, 108 Authority officers undertook
formal in-service training with the USBR. This training was designed as
far as possible to match the experience and abilities of the trainees and
the role that was expected of them on their return to Australia.

Whilst everything did not go entirely smoothly with the traineeship

program, the trainees and the Authority did obtain major benefits from
it.

The trainees gained experience in USBR techniques, practices and

procedures, and acquired knowledge specific to design, planning, construction
and operation techniques. They learned how to adapt these techniques
and systems to the conditions existing in the Snowy.[30j Their contact
with Bureau officers also assisted in a direct communications flow at an
individual level.

The Authority benefitted from the program, certainly

because it received back highly trained staff, but also because the trainees
worked on Authority design issues whilst with the Bureau. The Authority
also gained additional benefit from the trainees' experience with the Bureau
because their exposure lessened the typical resistance to change which
occurs when technology comes from an external source.

The Bureau also received a benefit from having the trainees work
with them because the trainees undertook Bureau work including design
whilst still being paid by the Authority.

In fact the trainees did Authority

and other work for the Bureau whilst they were being paid a salary and
the Bureau was being paid to complete the design work, both paid by the
Authority.
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THE ROLE OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE
One of the pre-requisites for successful technology transfer is an
e f f e c t i v e system for ensuring that the information flows between the possessor
of technology and the user of that technology.

This delivery system or

infrastructure has been described as the key linking network or vehicle
between the producers and users of technology.[lJ

The infrastructure functions to bring perceived or articulated user
needs to the attention of funders and research producers, and in turn delivers
research results or technology to meet stated user requirements.

One

way of understanding how the infrastructure works is to follow the studies
of Anyos.[2j His model highlights the various functions of the infrastructure
by broadly defining the four categories of participants in the delivery systems
of industrialised nations as being funders or entrepreneurs, research and
development producers, linking agents or brokers, and users.

Funders or Entrepreneurs occur in both public and private organisations
that provide financial resources for the development or adoption of technologies.

In the USA this role is taken primarily by Federal Government

Agencies such as NASA, and large private sector producers such as IBM,
GM and AT & T. In the context of the Snowy Mountains Scheme it is
clear that the funder of the original research was the US Government
via its agency, the USBR. The Australian Government paid for the use
of this technology but should not be considered a funder in this sense.

Similarly, the Australian Government and the Snowy Mountains Scheme
could not be considered "research and development producers", a category
which includes government laboratories, universities, research institutions
and private research and development activities, for even though the SMA

conducted model simulation and other tests in its scientific services laboratories
(see chapter 6), the primary research and development was carried out by
the USBR, funded entirely from US Budget allocations.

It is not until the categories of "Linking Agents or Brokers" and
"Users" are considered that the involvement of the Australian Government
and the SMA becomes clearer.

Anyos' third category "Linking Agents or Brokers" include those public
or private organisations or individuals that expedite the movement or diffusion of technology within or across national boundaries.

These include

functional interest groups, professional organisations, trade associations,
consultants, and any others who work to utilise new technologies on existing
problems.

It is the broker's role to identify applications within the public

and private sectors.

Of course brokers need to recognise that utilisation

usually involves modifications and adaptation to meet the expressed needs
of the user.
The Australian Government, based on recommendations from officers
of the SMA and the relevant Ministers, acted as the Linking Agent or Broker
through identification of the stock of technology available to it from within
the USBR. This role was continued by becoming party to the assistance
Agreement, and by guaranteeing that resources would be available and
expended to cover the costs of accumulating and organising the information.
These resources which were originally estimated at between LI66 million
and LI83 million [3j (which included transmission) and subsequently adjusted
to between L170 m and L200 m [^J were made available by successive
Australian Governments following borrowings from the International Bank

totalling some L20^ m.[5j These figures reflect original estimates for
the total Scheme (not just the Upper Tumut works), and were again finally
adjusted to total $800m. [6J
The Government charged interest on this loan at a rate equal to
the long term bond rate (originally 3 1/8%) and repayable over a period
of 70 years from annual charges associated with the production of electricity
paid by the States of NSW and Victoria and the Commonwealth in proportion
to their entitlements to electrical energy.
The amount provided for the development and adaptation of appropriate technologies through the USBR was $3.3 m for the period 16 November
1951 to 30 3une 1971.[7j These charges represent USBR assistance in
terms of designs and specifications, operating records and instructions,
construction drawings, training of Authority staff, USER advisors attached
to the Scheme in Australia, and model development testing and simulation.
At the same time the Authority acted as a Linking Agent/Broker
through the provision in Denver of Liaison Officers who were either engineers
or administrators. This service was pursuant to paragraph 3 of the Agreement[8j which provided for the maintenance in Denver of a Liaison Engineer
as the Authority representative to co-ordinate technical phases of the
work being performed by the USBR including the training program. This
Engineer was to be assisted by an Administrative Officer responsible for
all administrative matters related to the maintenance and well being of
the engineer trainees assigned to training duties in the USA. This original
recommendation was however modified so that there were not always two
liaison persons in Denver at the same time. In the period 13 November

1951, when Mr I.L. Pinkerton the first Liaison Engineer arrived, to February
1962 when the Denver office was closed, twelve Authority officers acted
in a liaison capacity, usually for a period of some 12 months.[9j

This requirement by the USBR to establish appropriate co-ordination
mechanisms with Denver was based on their experience that the sending
of papers, specifications, and procedures do not of themselves facilitate
e f f e c t i v e transfer.

To transfer know-how, much of which is not written

down, there is frequently no substitute for person to person training and
assistance.

The role of the liaison representative went further than merely coordinating the relevant training programs, for often these programs were
varied at short notice to take advantage of specialised training and inspections
of USBR and other facilities which arose on an 'ad hoc' basis but which
were of benefit to the trainee and the Scheme.

Variation also occurred

from time to time to match specific situations which occurred in Australia
a f t e r the trainees had departed for the USER in Denver.

In addition it fell to these liaison officers to provide the necessary
administrative and personal support so often necessary with overseas training.
These functions included security and customs clearances, entry visas,
accommodation, banking and pay details, travel both within the USA and
return to Australia, counselling, progress reports on training and a range
of other minor services including telephone connection and rental payment,
and provision of cutlery and linen for the rented apartments.

Some of the trainees remained in the USA at various times to take
over the duties of Liaison Officer. This added another dimension to their
training by virtue of exposure to the administrative requirements of maintaining
the training scheme as well as exposure to the broader administrative
aspects of the USBR systems of operation including style, procedures and
practices, filing systems, referencing, paper flow, and decision making
processes. These concepts and practices returned with them to the Authority.
Of the Liaison Officers who served in the USA, most went on to
senior administrative or engineering positions within the Authority on their
return. Mr K.E. Andrews, who was in the USA from October 1953 to 3uly
became an Associate Commissioner, and Mr P.G. Collins, October
1956 to September 1957, went on to become Associate and then Acting
Commissioner of the Authority.
The final category in this model refers to "Users", i.e. those who
benefit directly from the transfer of a given technology, usually the private
industrial sector, and those who benefit indirectly, the ultimate user or
consumer of the product or the technology.
The User assists in the delivery of technology by still further adapting
the technology for other uses, as well as those uses for which it was originally
transferred. Continued useage and modification reinforces the appropriateness
of choice of technology and effectiveness of transfer. Of course in the
case under consideration it would have been most surprising if the users
of the technology had indeed not utilised it for the purposes for which
it was intended.

Whilst the above model is useful in understanding some aspects of
the role of infrastructure in technology transfer, it is less useful when
examining the role of the structure and management of an agency responsible
for the successful transfer of technology which does not conveniently fit
into one of its four categories.

This is the case with the SMA.

Characteristically, the transfers of technology to developing countries
are "new track transfers"(p.l l)[10j, that is, the new technology cannot be
transferred without modification into an existing activity.

In order for

the new track to be utilised there must be brought into being an institutional,
technical and cultural infrastructure as a context for organisation and
operation.

Such an organisation or institution is according to Strassmann[l IJ,

one of the determinants of the success or failure of technology transfer.

The Snowy Mountains Hydro-electric Authority was created in order
to achieve the successful construction of the Scheme by whatever means
and utilising whatever methods it could within the provisions of its enabling
legislation.

As has been seen it was quickly recognised that there were

insufficient trained and experienced engineers in Australia at the inception
of the Scheme's development and that to undertake the necessary design
and planning to satisfy the timeframes for development within Australia
was clearly impracticable.

An appropriate organisational structure thus

had to be developed that would facilitate the transfer of technology via
USBR design, development and other technical assistance from the USA,
the training of Authority engineers in the USA, and USBR advisers attached
to the Scheme as well as carry out the planning and construction of the
Scheme.

In this situation the Australian governnnent was again to use the
experiences of the USA. According to Wettenhall[12j, the Tennessee Valley
Authority was used an an exemplar in a number of ways leading up to the
creation of the SMA. These included:
(i) "The NSW Parliament received a special report on it after an overseas visit by the State Premier in 19^3;
(ii) the legislation creating the TVA and the lawsuits by which it had
been challenged were the subject of a special study by the so
called Officers Committee under the chairmanship of the Federal
Director-General of Works, Dr L.F.Loder;
(iii) there was much further discussion of the TVA experience when
the bill to create SMA was before the Federal parliament; and
(iv) it was no accident that the title 'Authority' was used rather than
the more familiar 'Commission' or 'Board'."(p.87)
The TVA set up in 1933 by the US Federal Government covered
the complete Tennessee Valley watershed, covering 000 square miles
and including portions of seven states[13j. It was established as part
of President Roosevelt's "New Deal" programme, and was justified to the
US Congress by its defense functions and capacities. In commending the
creating legislation to Congress, he indicated he was seeking a corporation:
". . clothed with the power of government but possessed of the
flexibility and initiative of a private enterprise,"
(and)

. charged with the broadest duty of planning for the proper use,
conservation, and development of the natural resources of the
Tennessee River drainage basin and its adjoining territory for the
general social and economic welfare of the Nation . ."(p.^9)[l^J

By the late 19^0s the TV A had won world wide acclaim for its
achievements in the development of the region encapsulated in its legislation.
Social studies were also beginning to suggest that the corporate dedication
to, and consideration of, the interests of the people of the region were
more than compensating for the loss of direct external Government control
that arose from its operation as a public corporation.[15j

Needless to

say the TVA utilised the services of the USBR during its construction and
development stages.

Its charter, structure and role was such that it was

receptive to the technical knowledge, techniques and information flows
from the technological stock possessed by the USBR.

The success of the TVA and the role played by the Government
in its development were not lost on some Australians.

Casey[16j described

it in 19^9 as a development stimulator, commenting that:
"Certain forms of Government activity can play a most valuable
part in stimulating private enterprise . . . Lord Keynes has said that
the sphere of Government is not in doing something that is already
being done - and doing it a little better or a little worse - but in
doing those things that are not now being done at all . . .

Future

TVA's may well have nothing to do with flood control or the generation
of electricity - but the valuable thing that America has taught us
is the idea behind TVA - that the creation of conditions under which

the energy and the creative imagination of countless individuals can
be released, so that they can get a move on." (p.7)
That the SMA was established as an Authority and not as a department
of the executive government (or ministerial department) allowed it greater
flexibility in financing, staffing, procurement and other elements of administration than was possible under conventional machinery. This ensured
that it was capable of being a sufficiently powerful agency of action and coordination[17j to assist rather than act as a barrier to, the intake of superior
technology.
The Authority's organisation structure was headed by a Commissioner[18j
and two Associate Commissioners who were directly responsible for the
five engineering groups which comprised Investigations (Engineering and
Economic), Civil Engineering Design and Scientific Services, Major Contracts,
Electrical and Mechanical Engineering, and Field Construction, and two
service groups comprising Finance and Administration, and Stores and
Supply.[19j
The initial ideas presented for each project were examined by the
Investigations Group engineers. After a general feasibility study, a broad
outline of the work was programmed and preliminary investigation begun.
Economics were carefully examined and alternative propositions developed
following which further investigations were undertaken in greater detail.
These included the collection of data on stream flow, climatological conditions,
snow cover, water quality and sediment concentration, and entailed field
surveys, aerial photography, photogrammetry, map-making, geological exploration
and drilling for geological core. Obviously, the more information that

could be obtained at this stage the more comprehensive and more soundly
based would be the preliminary designs.
The information thus obtained was then usually consolidated in report
form in which the general overall design of the project was suggested.
After further examination a particular general design was adopted and
the work taken to the next stage of its development.
Working within the scope of the general design, the Civil Design
and Scientific Services Group engineers and scientists produced detailed
designs of the various sections of the project. This often necessitated
further scientific studies covering such fields as soil analysis, weld-parameters,
model studies of water flow and river bed movement, concrete studies,
and so forth. Many of the engineering problems which emerged at this
stage and also in the earlier investigation stage were solved by utilising
the Authority's General Electric System 225 computer facilities.
During this stage, work began on detailed estimates and cost analyses,
and on the preparation of tender documents and specifications. The Authority
called on the services of its consultants, the USBR, to act as engineering
auditors, which ensured that the work was based on sound engineering
and technical practices.
As the final designs were approved, the Civil Design and Scientific
Services Group prepared the detailed contractual drawings and documents.
Contracts were advertised, and tenders received and examined. The contracts
were then placed with civil construction organisations.

Due to the magnitude of many of the contracts (some of which exceeded
$^0 million in value), this contract work involved the employment mainly
of overseas contractors, but most of the staff and all the working teams
were Australian residents, many of them new migrants.

In order to reduce

the time of construction, the Authority's planning was based on its own
field construction forces undertaking the building of access roads to the
project sites, the provision of initial accommodation for the contractor's
work force and the supply of power for construction purposes.

The Field Construction Division was therefore responsible for road construction and heavy plant necessary for this work and for erection and maintenance of accommodation on the works sites.

It also controlled the Authority's

three a i r c r a f t , which had a total seating capacity of 23, and which were
used for the rapid transportation of personnel and supplies. The aircraft
were also used extensively in aerial survey work.

The Major Contracts Group was responsible for the management,
co-ordination and supervision of major civil engineering contracts.

These

engineers collaborated closely with the design engineers in ensuring that
technical adequacy and proper engineering standards were maintained during
the course of the contract work. Since the start of major contract work,
this group supervised the construction of contracts worth over $^00 million
by the late 1960s.

In hydro-electric engineering it is customary for the civil works
to be separated from mechanical and electrical works insofar as contractual
work is concerned. The Electrical & Mechanical Group, however, worked

closely with t h e civil design engineers in design, cost e s t i m a t e s , material
e s t i m a t e s and equipment specifications for the electrical and mechanical
plant installed in civil works.

This group was also responsible for t h e

installation of t h e plant and for t h e operation of t h e Authority's power
producing installations and systems not under the control of t h e Snowy
Mountains Council - the body responsible for the general operation of t h e
Scheme's power stations.

The Finance and Administration Group was responsible for the analysis,
appraisal, development and administrative organisation, methods and general
procedures for t h e e f f e c t i v e control of finance and administration throughout
t h e Scheme.

In addition it provided protective services, medical and legal

services and general printing facilities as well as transport control of a
large f l e e t of vehicles and general services to the other groups.

Finally, t h e o f f i c e r s of the Stores and Supply Division were responsible
for the purchase of all supplies and for the disposal of surplus stores and
equipment.

Their duties include arrangements for import licences, custom

c l e a r a n c e s and duty refunds.

The aim of this s t r u c t u r e was to pinpoint responsibility for progress
and expenditure on each item of the works to one of the above groups
i r r e s p e c t i v e of where the work was carried out and at the same t i m e to
ensure t h a t t h e r e was economical co-ordination of all work being carried
out in any one location.

To fulfill these requirements the functional form of organistion was
adopted whereby the responsibility of each group was explicitly defined.

Wherever the function of that group was exercised, the methods and procedures
were in accordance with the direction of that group. For co-ordination
of work within any region, a Regional Engineer or administrative officer
was appointed to exercise functions which, to a large extent, were similar
to those of the Authority (Commissioner) for the whole of the Scheme.
Responsibilities thus included general discipline, adequacy of accommodation
and meals, co-ordination of transport, and overall utilisation of labour.
This bureaucratic structure closely paralleled the structure of the USBR
with its high degree of structure of activities including the division of
work into specialist jobs, the establishment of routines and procedures
and the formalisation of them in written record,[20j the concentration
of authority, and the control of workflow by line as opposed to staff
personnel.[21J

Mention was made in the discussion of the Anyos Model[22j, of the
role of the Authority's Scientific Services Laboratories which whilst not
being regarded as prime research and development producers played an
important role in the successful transfer of technology from the USBR.
These laboratories fulfilled three main functions: the elimination as far
as possible of the unknown or unforeseeable conditions inherent in all projects,
such as dam foundations and power station excavations; control over the
quality of materials and workmanship;

and the preparation of the grounds

for the application of advanced engineering techniques to the design and
construction of structures.[23j The types of work undertaken to fulfill
these functions included the investigations of geology and construction
materials during the planning stage of the projects, the use of scientific
methods and model studies to find solutions to design problems when these
could not be solved by mathematical analyses, and the application of quantity

and quality control tests to construction materials and workmanship. The
high standard of these facilities were such that the laboratories were registered
by the National Association of Testing Authorities in several fields.[2^J

In addition to the provision of special services, e.g. photographic
facilities and model and instrument workshops, the laboratories also provided
training for specialised personnel such as inspectors, hydrographers and
survey s t a f f , and post graduate training for engineers and other professional
staff.

Many of the staff of the Scientific Services Division which included

the Laboratories, had been trained by the USBR under the traineeship
program (mentioned in chapter 7) in the professional techniques, analysis,
documentation and methods which they used as the basis for training the
other personnel mentioned above.
The centralised location of the laboratories, within easy access of
both the head office and the field construction operation, followed the
USBR practice, and was an important factor in ensuring the successful
understanding and integration of operations.

It resulted for example in

the design engineers being able to observe model experiments being carried
out in the laboratories on their behalf.

Similarly construction engineers

kept closely in touch with tests on cements, sails, steels and other construction
materials.

An important outworking of this centralised location was the

e f f e c t i v e exchange of information, and increased interest and confidence
that built up between the laboratories engineers and scientists on the one
hand and the design and construction engineers on the other.

This exchange

was further enhanced by the presence and participation of the USBR advisers.

The elements of the Anyos model can be seen to be present within

the SMA. However the important role played by the infrastructure in ternns
of its assistance to the technology transfer process is better understood
by emphasising the elements within the delivery system such as finance,
the holders of the stock of knowledge, the organisational structure of the
Authority, the interaction between the various parts of the structure, and
the individuals within the system. There is no doubt that without an effective
infrastructure or delivery system, the transfer of technology from the
USBR to Australia and from the initial point of contact to other aspects
of the Scheme would not have been as successful.
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CONCLUSION
The foundations for the a c c e p t a n c e of a development such as the
S c h e m e may be found in the Commonwealth Government's position with
regard t o its post war reconstruction responsibilities.

Reconstruction is

not a single s u b j e c t in itself but rather goes to the aspirations of the community
for a b e t t e r way of life, and thus involves the whole complex of social,
e c o n o m i c and political arrangements of that community.[lJ

As early as 19^3 Prime Minister Chifley [ 2 j was announcing that
t h e first duty of the Government must be to the men and women of the
fighting f o r c e s .

In order to address that duty and provide new jobs for

them and munition workers, primary production based on potential markets
a t home and abroad had to be rehabilitated.

Farmers had to be given

stability of income, farming methods had to be made more e f f i c i e n t , and
secondary production c a p a c i t y had also to be increased.

The principal

m a t t e r s in this program were water conservation and the extension of
electrical facilities.[3j

The decentralisation of munitions production in which more than
L l l million had been spent in over 35 Regional c e n t r e s providing f a c t o r i e s ,
plant and jobs for the local population was cited as an example of the
b e n e f i t s to be gained[^J

This base on which peace time a c t i v i t i e s could

build for the advancement of Australia was said to be dependent on the
supply and distribution of e l e c t r i c power.

When the proposals for the development of the Scheme first formally
c a m e to the n o t i c e of the Government in 19^6 [5] it was recognised that
such a s c h e m e could significantly assist the process of reconstruction,
and that in view of Australia's limited water resources, the final decision

on the use of the river system had to ensure the maximum benefit for
Australia generally. In releasing a report on the diversion of the Snowy
River, Lemmon commented that by exploiting the full potentialities of
the Snowy River the shortages of power that existed in New South Wales
and Victoria and the need to provide for rapidly increasing demand brought
about by continuous industrial development, could be met. If these potentialities were met, power for NSW and Victoria would be ensured well
into the future, as would water and thus an extension of the existing irrigation
systems.
In his address to Parliament, which was widely reported in the media,
Chifley[6j announced that proposals to divert the Snowy River only recently
discussed with the various State Premiers were ". . . of such magnitude,
and of such great national interest . . ."(p.32)[7j that they had to be discussed
forthwith. Not only because such a development would be very costly,
but also because the proposals would mean the production of power at
half the cost of coal stations, less amounts of expendable coal would be
used, more water would be supplied, and the power would be produced
away from the cities so that key industries and research requiring considerable
power could be undertaken in relative security. He went on to remind
people that:
"One of the Commonwealth Government's early policy decisions was
that dealing with the decentralisation of industry. Cheap reliable power
provided in congenial country areas would provide an incentive to decentralise industries especially those dependent on agricultural pursuits.
A scheme so vast and so beneficial is a national asset in the fullest
sense of the word. It would be one of the greatest projects in the

history of Australia's development. . ."(p.32)[8j
Following Cabinet approval on 22 May 19^9, Chifley [9J announced
that legislation would be introduced to Parliament enabling the establishment
of the Snowy Scheme, a two-sided plan providing for vast supplies of new
power and the immense decentralisation of industry and population.
Reconstruction and development activities aimed at improving the
national economy and the lifestyles and welfare of the community at large,
are never costless. In the final analysis a Government has to strike a balance
[lOj between the often non-quantifiable environmental and social values,
and relatively straight forward economic values.
In the planning of most major developments, at least in recent times,
some assessment of the economic viability or cost-benefit, has played
a role in the final decision to proceed or not. The objective of cost benefit
analysis is to determine whether the benefits derived from a project outweigh
the costs incurred. In order to achieve this objective, the costs and benefits
have first to be identified, and then ascribed a monetary value. One criticism
of cost benefit analysis is that not all costs and benefits can be or are
identified, nor can they always be quantified. As well as the direct costs
and benefits, a number of other factors have an impact on the analysis;
these include the time period adopted, the discount rate selected, the
decision criteria, external costs and social costs as well as a number of
background assumptions, both stated and unstated. All these factors require
a judgement to be made, often on little or no evidence, but once they
have been expressed numerically and then manipulated according to formal
rules they tend to be assigned an objectivity and certainty.[lIJ

The first comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of the Schenne was
contained in the Final Report by the Commonwealth and State Officers,
1950.[12J Prior to this, earlier assessments appear to have taken the form
of suggested benefit statements with little indication of the indices, tests
and measurements on which projections were based. Figures had been
produced of course for the various State Committees and the Joint Working
Parties prior to announcements in Parliament of the benefits of the Scheme,
however it was pointed out that whilst the degree of accuracy was ample
for preliminary studies it was . . by no means adequate for the complete
designing of the development. . ."(p.^l)[13j. Notwithstanding these types
of cautions it was announced in Parliament that the Scheme could irrigate
an additional 300 000 acres for a gross annual return in the value of food
stuffs of at least L20 million, and ultimately 750 000 horsepower [l^J,
with a consequent saving of expendable coal reserves. Differing initial
proposals lead to differing costs and benefits being described, however
in introducing the Snowy Mountains Hydro-electric Power Bill to Parliament
in 19^9, it was stated that the Scheme would ensure annual production
of some 1 720 000 kW, almost as much as the total capacity of all power
stations in Australia at that time.[15j Moreover it was stated that this
power could be produced at about half the cost of thermal power generation
representing a saving of ^ million tons of coal per year or about one third
of the output at that time.[16j In addition to the power component, 1.8
million acre feet of water would be made available, equal to some three
to four times the amount then used in the Leeton-Griffith irrigation area.[17j
In their statistics for the recommended developments, the Committee
of Commonwealth and State Officers put forward information based on
figures which had not been definitely established, and were preliminary

and indicative in nature. With regard to power generation, whilst it was
intended that the Scheme

would work in conjunction with steam (thermal)

stations in the States, the economic unit of capacity had not been completely
studied

. .due to the limited time available and to the lack of data and

staff . . ."(p.29)[18j

These tentative values for maximum demand and

installed capacities were used however to assist in the determination of
the costs and economics of the proposal. Tumut 1 Power Station was
given the approximate figures of average head of 980 feet, an average
flow of 1,250 cusecs, an installed capacity of 320 000 kW, an average
output of 86 000 kW and a load factor on installaed capacity of 27%, whilst
Tumut 2 Power Station was accorded the approximate corresponding figures
of 920 feet, 1320 cusecs, 320 000 kW, 85 000 kW, and 27% load factor.[19J

A similar situation was stated to exist with regard to the benefits
and availability of increased water resources.

A close determination of

the total extra water available for irrigation in the Murrumbidgee and
Murray Valleys was not made because of " . . . a shortage of time and
staff"(p.30).[20j

However even with additional data on the monthly diversions

to the Murray and Tumut Rivers made available by the Hydro-Electric
Sub-Committee, a considerable amount of work was stated to remain ". . .
to determine how effective the proposed storages will be in regulating
the water for irrigational use and whether any additional storage will be
necessary."(p.30)[21j.

The average water available each year due to diversions

alone to the Murrumbidgee was estimated to be 565,000 acre-feet per
year of extra new water whilst the total average extra water available
for irrigation use (by both diversion and regulation) was tentatively approximated
at 1 ^00 000 acre feet per year [22j in the Murrumbidgee Valley.
figures apply only to the Tumut Proposal.

These

The total Scheme statistics

being 2 620 000 kW of power production and 2 300 000 acre feet of extra
water for irrigation.[23j
Costing for construction of the Scheme was not frequently raised in
the Parliament however the figures of L65m [2H tl66m [25], and LI83m
[26j were mentioned at various times. The calculation of these costs was
based on fairly rudimentary information and varied according to the alternative
being put. For example, the costs of diversion of the Snowy to the Murray
River as finally put to the Government were based on the proposed diversion
costs of the Murrumbidgee which were first prepared in 1939, updated
in 19^^ by simply adding 30% to the civil engineering construction items
generally and again in 19^7 by re-estimating at the then current rates
for the cost of power stations and transmission lines, but not re-doing
the whole calculation. The estimates were reviewed in 19^9 to reflect
the considerable increase in the costs of labour and materials. The Committee
also expressed the view that:
"Any increases in costs due to rising price levels may be expected to
be accompanied by similar increases in the value of power, thus the
economic comparison should be more or less unaffected". (p.32)[27j
The rates used for the estimates for the dams as with other civil engineering
works, were increased in 19^8 by a notional 33% above the
rate and
by 75% above those of 1939.[28J
The attempts to provide a cost-benefit analysis for the Scheme highlight
many of the problems associated with such an analysis. All the costs and
benefits cannot be known, included or measured. In particular consideration
of environmental and social welfare factors are almost impossible to quantify
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whilst still having a significant bearing on a decision to invest in a particular
project.

In f a c t it could be argued that it is impossible to ascribe values

t o costs and benefits at all, since they lie in the realm of conjecture rather
than an objective scientific exercise.

This is particularly so in the case

of the defense considerations and arguments put forward in support of
construction of the Scheme.

The use of cost-benefit analysis in technology assessment is really
a political a c t and as Johnston says "produces a spurious mathematical
precision for very imprecisely known relationships".(p.l20)[29j

It is thus

apparent t h a t the rationale for building the Scheme included a large component
t h a t was not quantifiable.

Indeed much of it had to do with the psychological

values to the nation of inspiration and confidence, especially as they related
to the momentum of the national economy, and the provision of jobs.

Information relating to the costs and benefits of the Scheme is documented
in a number of d i f f e r e n t sources and is at least capable of some degree of
analysis as shown by those who question the economic rationale for the
Scheme's construction and existence.[30j This information is however retrospective, achieved by attempting to measure now those benefits only predicted
prior to and during construction, and costs which utilise different methodologies
and f a c t o r s to the original.

Just as the analysis of the Scheme's costs and benefits provides some
insights into the rationale behind the Scheme, a similar examination of the
significant but little acknowledged role played by the USBR may prove
insightful. A cost-benefit analysis of the role of the USBR is however
a far more difficult exercise especially given the lack of recognition of

the role they played. Apart from acknowledgements and comments contained
in Annual Reports of the Authority until the late 1950s, no other documentation on the Scheme has made more than a fleeting reference to, or acknowlege of, the contribution made by the Bureau.
It is not generally well understood that when the Authority was
brought into being it had to face up to an immense amount of detailed
investigation and design work, a task which was estimated to take well
over 100 engineers some years to complete.[31J
On the establishment of the Authority a decision had to be made
which of two courses would be followed. Would it on the one hand concentrate
on investigation and defer construction for two or three years until designs
had reached an advanced stage, or on the other, carry out investigations
and preliminary construction work concurrently. It is history now that
the latter course was adopted.
In the original documentation supporting the use of the USBR it was
stated that by them undertaking the design of the Upper Tumut groups
of works, to the stage of compilation of specifications and contract drawings
so that contracts could be let. Authority staff could then concentrate
their efforts on work which would otherwise not have been completed
for some time. Further their assistance was said to be an important factor
in expediting the supply of blocks of power from the Scheme, and that
the probable costs would be $250 000, but that this estimate was very
approximate.[32j
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In reply to a question (from Casey) regarding the length of time
until the Upper Tumut works were complete, Hudson sent an urgent telex
advising that the normal program would take some 8-9 years giving about
230 000 kW with the second station two years later bringing the total
for the Upper Tumut work to about 500 000 kW. He further advised that
as an urgent defence measure all U.T. works could be completed within
six years by adopting unorthodox methods for placing overseas contracts.
In continuing to stress the defence aspects he stated that power demand
in combatant countries increased 50% during the early stages of World War
2 and that if war broke out again in the next few years Australia would
not be able to meet the increased power demands unless appropriate steps,
including expediting the Tumut Works, were taken straight away.[33j

This approach was supported by Casey who agreed that use of the
USBR would allow the Scheme to go ahead faster on the design side and
make it unnecessary for the Authority to recruit a large number of high
level design s t a f f . Although the USBR would do the work at cost, rates
of pay were much higher in the USA than Australia, it was believed on
net balance that the work would actually cost much less and would be
done much quicker than the Authority could possibly do it.

In supporting

this approach both the practical and political importance of associating
with a technical branch of the United States Government was stressed.
It was stated that:
". . . it is clear that any work undertaken by the USER would always
be of exceptional value to us, quite apart from the rate at which the
actual project itself may be carried out. The design work will always
be an essential pre-requisite of the actual development work and we

will save our available resources of Australian technical manpower
if we can get the Americans to do this job for us".(p.l)[35j
It was estimated that the total cost of the design work would not exceed
$230 000, spread over two financial years. [36J

As discussed in Chapter 5, it was agreed that the Bureau would
carry out all design and specification for the Upper Tumut Works to the
stage where construction tenders would be called (modified Scheme C)
at a final estimated cost of $800 000. In this equation it should be remembered
that a unit of work in Australia costing LI would cost $5 in America.
[37j

It was also agreed that the Technical Training Scheme would go ahead

at an estimated total cost of some $80 000.

However as early as 1953

the Authority was seeking further assistance from the Bureau[38j, extending
to the general review of the proposed layout, and design contract and
construction drawings for large sections of the 12 project.
work was estimated at a further $375 000.

This additional

During 1956 the Bureau was

again requested to undertake additional work, this time in relation to the
Eucumbene-Tumut Tunnel, and by the end of 1958 had undertaken still
further work to the value of $2^5 500.[39J The majority of work covered
two major peaks, 1953-^ and 1958-9, after which work dropped away significantly.

Notwithstanding the original intention to only involve the Bureau
in the short term, the last accounts were received from them in the last
quarter of 1970.

The total cost of Bureau services, not including costs

incurred in Australia, was $3 317 695.76.[^0j

This sum included training,

designs, specifications, records, contract drawings, operating criteria and
instructions, analysis of data, model testing, observers, administrative

overheads, liaison administration, and a special standing charge. The parties
ceased their formal arrangements in 197^ when the Bureau remitted the
remainder of its advance from the Authority ($1 555.67) following a request
from Commissioner Dann. [^Ij This cessation of formal arrangements
did not however diminish the range or rate of informal contact between
individuals at a number of different levels within the respective organisations.
Indeed these contacts, which are virtually impossible to quantify, are among
the benefits to result from the involvement of the USBR.
The benefits of utilising the services of the Bureau should be seen
as applying at a number of different levels. At the most obvious level
the assistance of the USBR in the design of certain of the works enabled
contracts for parts of the Upper Tumut works to be advertised and placed
at least eighteen months to two years earlier than would otherwise have
been possible,
and tenders for the final construction were also able
to be advanced.[^3j During this period of the 1930s shortages of appropriately
skilled and experienced engineers and technical personnel were being experienced
not only in Australia but worldwide, and:
". . . the inability to attract them to Australia would have had serious
consequences (for the Authority) if not for the Bureau undertaking
a large portion of the designs for the Upper Tumut works".(p.21)[^^J
What was also obvious was the assistance given in what could be called
hard copy, including drawings, designs and specifications; contractual
documentation and procedures; written operating and maintenance instructions
and procedures; results of research and tests including model tests; written
analysis of data, and critiques and recommendations. The Authority still
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utilises the operating and maintenance manuals, and calculations developed
by the USBR, which provide the foundations for the day to day operations
of the Scheme. Though these documents and analytic models have been
rewritten under the Authority's banner, they draw almost exclusively on
the original USBR documentation. The original, and fundamental design
drawings too are maintained because they provide the base from which
minor modification works drawings are produced. It should be noted however
that there has been no significant modification to the design or operation
of the Upper Tumut works to that which was originally specified by the
Bureau.
Advice from USBR personnel took both the formal and informal
formats. Their formal advice often closely resembled instructions, but
also went to written recommendations and suggestions. The emphasis
on local management of projects and acceptance of responsibility by those
on site, which was strongly argued for by the USBR consultants, and originally
introduced during the construction of the Scheme, has recently been reintroduced to the Authority. This followed a review by external management
consultants who recommended that the existing matrix and corporate
management styles were not appropriate for an organisation whose main
areas of activity were decentralised, and thus should be administered by
local management with support and advice from the head office.[45j
Similarly, the use of the new form of contracts utilising a schedule
of unit prices as opposed to the cost plus fixed fee type, was introduced
largely at the behest of the USBR and proved to operate most effectively
during the construction of the Scheme. This type of contract has now
become the preferred model for civil construction contracts in Australia

both because of its obvious benefits and because nnany of those who used
this type of contract with the Scheme have gone on to do major civil and
construction industry contract work both in Australia and overseas.

This

latter group includes such organisations as Thiess Brothers, John Holland
Constructions, Concrete Industries (Monier), Humes Ltd, and Allied Constructions Pty Ltd. [^6J

The Scheme also gained benefits both formally and informally from
Authority trainees who studied in Denver. That they took copious notes
and copies of relevant systems and procedures is beyond doubt.

However

they also benefitted from the unwritten guidance, counsel, suggestions
and advice of Bureau s t a f f . Hudson commented on the fact that the training ". . . will be of inestimable value to the Authority . ."(p.l l)[^7j, and
that

. Bureau trained Authority engineers were able to assume greater

responsibility for engineering design .

(p.20)[^8j, thus allowing other

more senior engineers to concentrate on more difficult construction related
work.

Thus the value of the training, both formal and informal, lay in

its immediacy and ability to be repeated at any time.

At the least obvious level, and the most difficult to specify, are the
benefits gained by those who were exposed to the USBR's operating methods
either directly or indirectly, including trainees, contractors and their employees,
and Authority personnel, who as a result performed their work in a different
and more e f f e c t i v e manner.

Mention has already been made of some of

the construction contractors, however others which should be included
are Electric Power Transmission (EPT) Pty Ltd., Standard Telephones and
Cables Pty Ltd, Boving and Co Ltd., Clyde Engineering Co. Pty Ltd, Carrier
Air Conditioning Ltd, Mining and General Engineering Ltd, O'Donnell

1^7

Griffin and Co. Pty Ltd, and Wormald Bros Pty Ltd.[¿f9j 3ust as it is very
d i f f i c u l t t o t r a c e staff of these organisations who have gone to other newer
construction and contracting companies and taken their knowledge and
skills with t h e m , so too it is difficult to t r a c e the whereabouts or present
job a r e a s and responsibilities of all those who worked on the Scheme and
who were in all probability a f f e c t e d by the USBR practices or personnel
in one way or another.

Some technical s t a f f , including engineers who

studied with t h e USBR in Denver have remained with the Authority to
this day.

These include Messrs F. Millner (Operations Planning Engineer),

R. McKay (Main Plant Engineer), K. Montague (Senior Executive Engineer
C o r p o r a t e Services), J . McLean (Investigations Engineer), R. Dawson (Executive
Engineer Civil), G. Shelton (Technical Services Engineer), R. Goddard
(Communications Systems Engineer), R. Warwick (Manager Maintenance
Planning), and F. Crook (Branch Head, Mechanical Engineering Maintenance).

Others who served with the Authority and trained with the USBR
a c c e p t e d positions with the Snowy Mountains Engineering Corporation.
These include Messrs D. Price (Managing Director), T. Lewis, R. Cameron
and R. Neal (General Managers Operations), 3, Hilton (General Manager
Engineering), R. Paton (General Manager Business Development), N. C a r t e r
(Manager Malaysia), M. Kotowicz (Manager Indonesia) and special consultants
3. Cooke (large dams and hydro-electric projects), A. Frost (electrical
and mechanical engineering), and 3. Hunter (civil engineering projects).

By virtue of their c o n t a c t with USRB staff and working procedures,
and t h e experience they gained on the Scheme, Authority staff as early
as 1957 began to provide formal assistance to other Government bodies
in Australia.

These included a diamond drilling t e a m to assist in field

1^8
investigations for the C o t t e r Dam (ACT), as well as advice and hydraulic
model experiments, and collection of hydrolographic data for the Humpty
Doo Rice P r o j e c t in the Northern Territory.[50j These consulting activities
remained and increased over the next f i f t e e n years until with the virtual
completion of t h e Scheme the Australian Government established in 1970
t h e international consulting organisation, the Snowy Mountains Engineering
Corporation, to retain the engineering skills and expertise built up during
t h e t i m e it took to investigate, design and construct the Scheme.

SMEC has utilised this experience in electrical, mechanical and civil
engineering aspects of both s u r f a c e and underground hydro-electric power
stations in various parts of the world in schemes ranging from 100 kW
c a p a c i t y t o those which incorporate 250 MW generating units.

Their experience

in t h e related a r e a of power transmission systems and substations covers
all stages f r o m pre-feasibility studies to the final commissioning for systems
ranging f r o m 11 kV to 330 kV, and includes expertise in t h e studies of
system stability, surge protection, load flow and voltage variation and
transmission line design and route selection.

Similarly their multi disciplinary

staff enables it to provide a range of services in prefeasibility investigations,
feasibility studies, field investigations and laboratory studies, design and
preparation of c o n t r a c t documents, c o n t r a c t management and construction
supervision, operation and maintenance, and training in t h e disciplines
of river basin studies, regional and rural development studies, dams, roads and
bridges, w a t e r supply irrigation and flood control, tunnels and underground
works, pipelines g a t e s and valves, field investigations, laboratory studies,
p r o j e c t m a n a g e m e n t , and power generation and transmission.
have been carried out in some

These services

countries including Afghanistan, Bahrain,

Bangladesh, Botswana, China, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Nepal,
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Papua, Phillipines, Saudi Arabia, United States, Vietnam and Yemen.[51J
In 1985 the United States engineering magazine Engineering News - Record,
ranked SMEC ^ I s t in the top 200 engineering design consultants world wide,
based on total fees earned outside home countries.[52j

It can be seen then that not only have a large number of Australians
and Australian companies benefited both directly and indirectly from the
assistance provided by the USBR but so too have overseas countries by virtue
of consulting projects undertaken by the Authority, SMEC, and other Australian companies whose working practices draw on their experiences from
the Scheme.

Whilst an analysis of the costs and benefits of the role of the USBR is
of interest, so too is an examination of the path by which the technology was
transferred to the Authority.

At the conceptual level there appear to be

three different ways for organisations to transfer new and improved products
and methods between countries:
set up with local partners;

through subsidiaries or joint ventures

through licencing or sale of patents, trademarks,

and other intellectual property rights;
sales or supply of turn-key plant.[53j

and through machinery and equipment
However, whilst this differentiation

appears relatively straight forward it was neither as clear in the 1950's
nor as directly applicable to the Scheme as may be suggested, partly because
the analysis goes more to private enterprise functions and partly because
the Authority and the Bureau appear to have had a special type of relationship
which does not fit any of the three paths. Issues of direct investment,
global strategy, e f f e c t s of balance of payments, and licencing agreements
which tend to be of concern to host governments today when acquiring
technology from private enterprise, did not appear to overly concern the

Federal Government and the Authority during the construction phase of
the Scheme. The two peak Governments dealt directly with each other
as did the two Authority's concerned, to the specific exclusion of private
enterprise organisations. There did not appear to be a profit motive involved
in the assistance provided by the Bureau, with overheads and other administrative charges having been kept to a minimal level. However, it could
be speculated that the interests of the American Government were somewhat
broader than the provision of assistance with regard to the construction
of the Scheme. This indication of their preparedness to assist with such
a venture especially when coupled with their role in the war effort and
Australia's increased reliance on them, could be seen as preparation for
a longer term influence both within Australia and the larger regional area.
It is questionable whether this type of arrangement for a major
construction scheme could work in today's climate given the changes in
funding. Governmental expectations for return on investment, the funding
of research and development, and the closer relationships between aid
provided to under-developed countries and their economic and political
success, not to mention multi national corporations and the profit motive.
Even if an arrangement such as that between the Authority and the Bureau
were able to be put, it is doubtful whether the costs would be the same.
In introducing technology and technology transfer it was stated that
change is often a cumulative process which requires considerable human
effort and commitment of resources. This was certainly true of the technology transfer between the USBR and the SMA. Whilst the basic engineering
concepts remained the same the designs, plans and specifications all under-

went change as the Schenne gradually evolved, as did the methods for achieving its development particularly in the areas of work organisation. The
Bureau, experienced in the provision of assistance to developing countries,
insisted on the commitment by the Authority of dedicated human resources
to assist in the transfer process. These included Australian liaison officers,
co-ordination engineers, and frequent visits to America which in turn were
reciprocated by Bureau personnel who visited the Authority to check development, in addition of course to the provision of dedicated engineering advisors
based on site in Australia. Other resources in terms of money, machinery
and materials were all commited by the Authority and the Commonwealth
Government on a progressive basis.
The people involved in the development and construction of the
Scheme, from the Governments of the U.S.A. and Australia, the staff of
the USBR and the SMA, staff of the contractors, and the day labour forces
all combined to ensure the successful completion of the Scheme. Some
of them were formal agents of change and transfer whilst others were
informal agents, some played major and long term roles whilst others were
involved only briefly. Irrespective of their formal or informal status their
contributions through planning, discussions, suggestions, directions, exhortations, delegation, criticism, organisation and control, all assisted the appropriate contextual fit and the requisite levels of communication. For some
to be able to identify and be identified with a national project which was
continuously publicised as the greatest engineering feat in Australia was
sufficient motivation. For others the simple fact that they were employed
and earning reasonable wages was sufficient motivation to endure the physical
hardships associated with construction of the Scheme. This motivation

to succeed permeated the workforce and greatly assisted the organisation's
receptivity to new techniques. The fact that the Authority was created
with the single purpose of first constructing and then operating the Scheme
ensured that the full attention of the staff was directed towards, and receptive
to, the appropriate technologies.
How then does one measure and report on whether the transfer of
Technology from America to Australia, but more specifically from the
USER to the Snowy Mountains Scheme, was successful?
It would appear obvious that the USBR possessed, by virtue of the
experience and expertise of its personnel and in its accumulated documentation
information and skills required by the Authority to commence the planning
and development of the Scheme. This planning and development was to
not only draw on the stock of knowledge "in situ" in Denver but also later
on from its advisors located in Australia. The speed with which the initial
parts of the Scheme could be commenced was important for achievement
of the Government's aims both for the Scheme and at the broader level
in terms of national reconstruction and one suspects for political survival.
For these latter reasons it is clear that the Government and the Scheme
as the receiver of the Technology not only wanted the information but
was prepared to initiate and support obtaining it. This is exemplified by
the capital borrowings and financial outlay of the Government, by the
establishment of an appropriate infrastructure, and by support for the
continued development of its personnel. The mutual confidence which
existed between the two National Governments and at Bureau and Authority
level was created and enhanced by the interchange of staff in the very
early days of the Scheme, e.g. visits by Mr (later Commissioner) Dexheimer

of the USER to Australia, and Associate Commissioner Lang of the Authority
t o the U S B R .

Prior c o n t a c t with USBR s t a f f had been made by Hudson

when with the Metropolitan Water Sewage 6c Drainage Board on the Warragamba Dam p r o j e c t and of course through knowledge of the experience of
USBR p r o j e c t work.

The Authority had shown its bona fides also by written

c o n t a c t with t h e US Government (through the Australian Embassy in
Washington) and with consultants to the USBR who commented favourably
on t h e job to be done and no doubt the public relations value of adding
such a s c h e m e to the Bureau's list of credits.

The f a c t that the Australian

Government was prepared to pay both for initial design assistance and
for the training of some of its engineers at a time when t h e r e was an
e x c e s s c a p a c i t y within the Bureau would also no doubt have appealed.

It should be obvious t h e r e f o r e that the Australian Government had
a d i r e c t involvement in both the financial and human resource allocation
issues, as well as enhancing the c l i m a t e in which the technology transfer
was t o t a k e place by a variety of measures including legislation, public
relations and education.

The Snowy Mountains Hydro-electric Power Act

19^9, the Authority's enabling legislation gave it enormous power over
t h e g a z e t t e d a r e a including the power to take land on lease, take easements
over land, sell or otherwise dispose of land vested in the Authority, (Section
18), t h e power to enter land (Section 19), the power to enter and occupy
land (Section 20), the power to raise or lower the level, impound, divert
or use the waters of a lake, river or stream (Section 21).

The most significant

power though was that the Authority was able "to do anything incidental to
its powers". (Section 18(j))[3^J

The flooding and rebuilding of the township

of Adaminaby is but one example of this power.

Perhaps n o t s u r p r i s i n g l y , t h e r e was no g r e a t c o m m u n i t y c o m m e n t
a b o u t t h e f l o o d i n g s or d a m a g e t o t h e e n v i r o n m e n t , due i n no s m a l l p a r t
t o t h e huge p u b l i c r e l a t i o n s c a m p a i g n m o u n t e d by b o t h t h e A u t h o r i t y and
t h e C o m m o n w e a l t h G o v e r n m e n t . This i n c l u d e d newspaper, r a d i o and l a t e r
t e l e v i s i o n progress r e p o r t s , t h e p r o d u c t i o n of v i g n e t t e s and news r e e l i t e m s
f o r m o v i e t h e a t r e s , and handouts, b r o c h u r e s , books and o t h e r p u b l i c a t i o n s
on t h e Scheme m o s t l y p r i n t e d w i t h i n i t s o w n p r i n t e r y . In a d d i t i o n t o these,
t h e A u t h o r i t y c o m m i s s i o n e d f i l m s of t h e Scheme's d e v e l o p m e n t and c o n d u c t e d
an e x t e n s i v e s y s t e m of p u b l i c r e l a t i o n s t o u r s by b o t h c o a c h and car c o n v o y .
A t one s t a g e t h e A u t h o r i t y had a p u b l i c r e l a t i o n s s t a f f in excess of
and over t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n days e n t e r t a i n e d an i m p r e s s i v e l i s t of R o y a l
and o t h e r d i g n i t a r i e s and o f f i c i a l v i s i t o r s .

Whilst t h i s d i r e c t i n v o l v e m e n t

is n o t of i t s e l f a measure of t h e success of t h e t r a n s f e r of t e c h n o l o g y ,
i t is a v e r y good i n d i c a t o r of t h e preparedness of t h e G o v e r n m e n t and
t h e A u t h o r i t y t o ensure t h e f o u n d a t i o n s and support f o r c o n t i n u i n g d e v e l o p m e n t
were present.

Thus i n s e t t i n g these f o u n d a t i o n s t h e G o v e r n m e n t c r e a t e d

n o t o n l y a new o r g a n i s a t i o n t h a t d i d not s u f f e r f r o m t h e n o r m a l r e s i s t a n c e
t o c h a n g e , e s p e c i a l l y t o t e c h n o l o g y f r o m an e x t r a m u r a l source, [55] b u t
also a m o t i v a t i o n and an a t t i t u d e t o succeed b o t h w i t h i n t h a t o r g a n i s a t i o n
and t h e c o m m u n i t y a t l a r g e .

Notwithstanding its critics, the majority

o f A u s t r a l i a n s t o d a y a c k n o w l e d g e t h e Scheme as one of t h i s n a t i o n ' s g r e a t e s t
achievements.

A v a i l a b l e l i t e r a t u r e suggests t h a t i f t h e e n u n c i a t e d needs a r e m e t ,
t h e d e f i n e d r e q u i r e m e n t s f u l f i l l e d , s t a t e d goals a t t a i n e d , p e r f o r m a n c e
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s m e t , i n s h o r t t h a t t h e r e q u i r e d job is done, t h e n t h e t r a n s f e r
of t e c h n o l o g y has been successful.

Based on t h i s c r i t e r i a , t h e c o m p l e t i o n

o f t h e Upper T u m u t w o r k s and f l o w i n g f r o m t h a t t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e

whole Scheme, was an outstanding success.

From the design of the broad

development p a r a m e t e r s and the completion of operational and c o n t r a c t
drawings, to t h e c o n t r a c t supervision the Bureau's involvement conformed
with, and in t h e f a c e of lack of defined requirements as o f t e n occurred,
specified t h e m , for the Authority.

The stated goals, initially assistance

with Modified Scheme C, but which as we have seen varied significantly
over t h e period of the following ten years, were clearly met, at a cost,
and within t h e t i m e f r a m e s allocated.

The f a c t t h a t both participants

spoke t h e same language and possessed similar notions of education, class,
and national interest also assisted in the smooth flow of scientific knowledge,
techniques and information.

There is no intention in this document to downgrade or in any way
diminish t h e exceptional achievement of those individuals who were and
a r e collectively responsible for the conception, planning, construction,
operation and maintenance of the Snowy Mountains Scheme.

Rather it

is t h e intention t o acknowledge the significant role played by the personnel
of t h e United States Bureau of Reclamation who manifestly assisted and
materially advanced the development of the Upper Tumut works of the
Scheme and who a t t h e same time were responsible for t h e successful
t r a n s f e r of relevant technology in the form of knowledge, techniques and
information, to the Authority and in the longer term to Australia and overseas
countries with which it has consulted.

This successful transfer of technology

was a joint venture between the Australian Government and the Snowy
Mountains Authority and the United States Government and the Bureau
of Reclamation, and was achieved because of direct legislation and financial
assistance, indirect encouragement and support, training and development,
both in America and Australia, technical assistance from the Bureau,

creation of a suitable infrastructure, and technical advice from Bureau
staff in Australia.
A construction project, the magnitude of which had never before
been attempted in Australia brought to successful completion under budget
and under time, and which satisfied the design parameters must by definition
be a success. The Snowy Mountains Scheme was and is a success, a success
due in no small part to the successful transfer of technology from the
United States Bureau of Reclamation.
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